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Children who are disabled' in their movement, speech, sensation,
behavior, or thought processes have evoked both heroism and retreat in
lawyers. From the landmark litigation that prohibited the pervasive
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I. The terms "disabled" and "handicapped" are used interchangeably in this Article.
Both have been used to refer to a wide range of conditions. This Article adopts the expan-
sive definition of "handicapped children" found in the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1977), which includes "mentally retarded, hard of
hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, or-
thopedically impaired, or other health impaired children or children with specific learning
disabilities. . ....
Numerous other federal statutes provide special benefits or protections for handicapped
persons, but establish conflicting criteria to define a "handicap" or "disability." See, e.g., 12
U.S.C. § 1701q(d)(4) (National Housing Act); 26 U.S.C. § 72(m)(7) (income tax treatment of
employee annuities); 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (vocational rehabilitation and civil rights); 38
U.S.C. § 601(l) (veterans' benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1) (Social Security); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6001(7) (Developmental Disabilities and Bill of Rights Act); 49 U.S.C. § 1612(d) (Urban
Mass Transit Act). While addressing a variety of disabilities, the Article places particular
emphasis on the issues relating to mental disability that have been considered by the
Supreme Court on a number of occasions in recent years. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo,
102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,
1302-10 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), decree modfed on remand, 673 F.2d 647
(3d Cir. 1982), cerl. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982). Cf. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442
(1982) (right of institutionalized mental patient to refuse treatment); Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (limited rights of children in civil commitment to mental hospital);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (mental patient's right to discharge).
On at least two occasions recently, the Court has construed the statutory rights of the
physically disabled. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982) (rights of deaf public
school student under Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975); Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1978) (limited rights of deaf nursing student
under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
[1359]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
exclusion of handicapped children from public schools, 2 to the "rou-
tine" probate hearings on petitions to commit children to mental hospi-
tals,3 lawyers have claimed to seek ordered liberty and quality services
for their clients. In some cases, attorneys have indeed sparked or sus-
tained personal and public concern for children who have been ne-
glected or mistreated by caretakers, service-providers, and the larger
society.
There are many ways, however, for lawyers to perpetuate neglect
or abuse. They may do so by failing to talk with their clients and those
who best understand them; 4 by suppressing or ignoring conflicts of
property, liberty, and other interests between lawyer and client or
among clients; 5 and by failing to create or exploit opportunities for
communication with adverse parties and relevant third parties.6 This
Article analyzes the psychological and social factors that contribute to
such "handicapped" advocacy, and proposes standards for appropriate
representation of this client group. The Article refers to a wide variety
of complainants, targets, and issues involved in litigation on behalf of
disabled youngsters.
7
The first part of the Article identifies the interpersonal, organiza-
tional, and allocational factors that make the representation of disabled
children particularly complex and problematic. It discusses the diffi-
culties a lawyer faces in trying to communicate with such clients and
their caretakers, including the potentially conflicting interests of the
child, the parents, and psychologists or educators.
The Article then sets forth three elements of responsible advocacy
in this field: (1) the duty to consult with the client, with his or her
caretakers, and with outside consultants; (2) the duty to identify and
2. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
3. See generally Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil
Commitment." A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Andalman & Chambers].
4. See notes 114-151 & accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 152-172 & accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 173-188 & accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (revers-
ing lower court decrees to close a large-scale institution for the retarded and to establish a
network of community-based group homes); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.DC. 1972) (same); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (prohibiting exclusion of handicapped children from public
schools); Bothman v. Warren B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 949 (1980) (parental right to withhold life-sustaining treatment for mentally re-
tarded child); Andalman & Chambers, supra note 3 (describing "routine" probate hearings
on petitions to commit children to mental hospitals).
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resolve conflicting liberty, property, and other interests among clients
and between clients and attorneys; and (3) the duty to negotiate ac-
tively with adversaries and concerned nonparties. The proposed duties
of consultation and conflict resolution would require special judicial
enforcement. In reviewing the current and proposed A.B.A. Codes of
Professional Responsibility, 8 the Article concludes that none of these
proposed duties would be ensured adequately. The difficulties of rep-
resenting handicapped children are not addressed sufficiently by cur-
rent and proposed standards governing legal representation.
Part One: The Distinctive Barriers to Advocacy
The legal representation of handicapped children poses problems
that differ from those encountered in representing any other client
group. Although impediments to effective representation may be exac-
erbated by the shortage of legal and other social resources for this client
group,9 resource constraints are not the sole cause of ineffective repre-
sentation. A child's disability further compounds the interpersonal
problems of advocacy; impediments arise from the limitations of dis-
abled children and those who care for them and serve them, including
parents and lawyers.
In representing handicapped children, lawyers must understand
their clients' caretakers and service-providers-particularly parents, di-
rect-care workers in institutions, and teachers. Parent, residential staff,
and teacher organizations have both initiated and resisted legal inter-
vention and legal reform on behalf of handicapped children.10
The Attorney-Client Relationship
Children as Problematic. Clients
Children often cannot or will not speak for themselves. Even if
they are willing and physically able to do so, they may not be capable
of assuming and sustaining the emotional burden of challenging par-
ents or caretakers. The child's incapacity may be cognitive; children
8. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980).
9. See Cohen, Advocacy, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 600
(M. Kindred ed. 1976); Herr, The New Clients: Legal Servicesfor Mentally Retarded Per-
sons, 31 STAN. L. REv. 553, 574-83 (1979).
10. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131 (3d Cir.
1979) (reversing denial of intervention motion brought by Pennhurst Parents/Staff Associa-
tion to oppose closing of institution sought by another parent organization, Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Children). See notes 58, 63 & accompanying text infra. See gener-
ally notes 56-109 & accompanying text infra.
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frequently lack the ability to identify violations of their legal rights. I I
On the other hand, the barrier may be emotional; the child may be
afraid to express a legal grievance against an authority figure.12 Even
as an adolescent, the child may be inhibited by moral uncertainty and
ambivalence from communicating legal grievances about an authority
figure.
13
Impaired communication with clients should be particularly
troublesome to lawyers, whose professional ethics 14 and personal pref-
11. Child psychologists Piaget and Kohlberg, in their influential studies of children's
conceptions of rules and justice, noted that preadolescent youngsters understand social rules
in concrete, egocentric, absolutist terms. J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD
50-65 (1965); Kohlberg, State and Sequence.- The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to So-
cialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 375-89 (D. Goslin
ed. 1969). The preadolescent child's emerging sense of equality is still tied to a primitive
retributive justice based on jealousy and vengeance. A sense of equity--or justice based on
intention and circumstances-and the recognition that social rules and legal rights are ab-
stract and criticizable begin in adolescence. See J. PIAGET, supra, at 65-76.
12. The child's moral universe is defined by parents and other parent-like authority
figures and consists of rewards and punishments dispensed by these authorities. Parents and
their surrogates (teachers, institutional staff, doctors) are the fountainhead of justice. To
challenge their authority is, in the eyes of the child, to invite retribution. See generally S.
FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO (J. Strachey trans. 1966).
Some psychologists speak of the child's internalization of the morality of authority figures as
a gradual process rooted in reward and punishment. See generally A. BANDURA, SOCIAL
LEARNING AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1963). Other, more psychoanalytically ori-
ented, theorists regard the internalization process as concentrated in the oedipal stage of
psychosexual development, which begins at age five or six. See E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD
AND SOCIETY 255-58 (2d ed. 1963); S. FREUD, The Dissolution ofthe Oedipus Complex, in 19
STANDARD EDITION OF THE WORKS OF FREUD 171-79 (1961).
13. See generally E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 261-63 (2d ed. 1963); E.
ERICKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 128-34 (1968); A. FREUD, Adolescence, in 13 THE
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 255, 275-76 (1958). Professor Burt, rejecting the
notion that lawyers and judges should defer uncritically to the expressed preferences of ado-
lescents in defining their rights and interests, made the following observation: "For all chil-
dren poised at adulthood, it is risky business to ask them whether they differ with their
parents on matters crucial to both and expect that the answer will give a reliable guide to
action in the child's interest. His true feeling is one of deep ambivalence, paralyzed into
silence or masked with brash assertion." Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of, In, And
For Children, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 118, 129 (1975).
Although a conceptual distinction can be made between a child's impaired or inhibited
expression of intentions and interests, and a child's awareness of these goals and interests,
these distinct impediments to communication with lawyers may be inseparable in fact. That
is, ambivalent or uncertain goals cannot be easily expressed; underdeveloped cognitive or
emotional capacity to understand the legal process may lead to a waffling, intimidated re-
sponse to this process.
14. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1979) (lawyer should




erences 15 generally lead them to expect and to value communication
with an autonomous client. Lawyers may seek a basic source of ac-
countability in the client's intuitive sense of rights and justice. In fram-
ing a complaint, in fashioning a remedy, in evaluating a settlement
offer, lawyers take at least a perfunctory look at what the client thinks
is "fair." Children probably will not be able to offer either sophisti-
cated practical and moral judgment or a stable set of desires and
problems.
The problem of communicating with a child-client can be con-
fronted in at least three ways: (1) by deferring to parents' interpreta-
tions of the child's needs and interests; (2) by relying on the attorney's
own expertise, or on that of a psychiatric professional, in penetrating
the child's world; or (3) by maintaining that the facts of a situation so
plainly evidence violation of the child's rights that client participation
is not essential. Each of these approaches is an acceptable partial re-
sponse to the problem of client autonomy in such cases, but each is
inadequate alone.
Deference to parents is not always helpful; many of the child's bar-
riers to communication are inherent, and do not depend upon that
child's relation to the party with whom he or she communicates.' 6 Fur-
thermore, information about children and their desires communicated
to lawyers through parents undergoes two levels of emotional and intel-
lectual distortion. Children may be unable or unwilling to give their
parents all the facts; parents may not fully relay information to lawyers.
Moreover, deference to parents is particularly inappropriate when par-
ents' interests are manifestly idverse to the child's, as in abuse cases,
17
or when parents disagree on the child's intentions and interests, as in
custody disputes.' 8 A more complex conffict of interests occurs in those
cases in which parents seek to commit their children to institutions. 19
While these considerations undermine the claim that parents are
the most accurate interpreters of their children's desires, parents in
most cases have a more intimate familiarity with their children's com-
munications and intentions than anyone else. Nonetheless, whatever
15. The predispositions and socialization of many attorneys impede their communica-
tion with children. See text accompanying notes 116-18 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
17. See Fraser, Independent Representation for the 4bused and Neglected Child- The
Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.L. REv. 16, 31 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fraser].
18. See Note, Lawyeringfor the Child- Princioles of Representation in Custody and Visi-
tation Disputes Arisingfrom Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126 (1978).
19. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Note, The Mental Hospitalization of Chil-
dren and the Limits of Parental Authority, 88 YALE L.. 186 (1978).
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right parents may have to serve as the sole legal spokespersons for their
children cannot be based entirely on their ability to represent accu-
rately their children's intentions and desires.
20
When faced with a conflict between parent and child, the lawyer
may rely on his or her own judgment, or on that of a judge or a consult-
ing psychiatrist, to determine what the child needs. The ability of a
lawyer or judge alone to perform this function, however, is questiona-
ble.2' Time and temperamental constraints may lead an attorney to
exclude legitimate participants in the definition of a child's legal
needs.
22
Instead of relying solely on his or her own intuition in this en-
deavor, the attorney may obtain more sophisticated interpretations of
the child's needs from professionals, such as psychiatrists and social
workers, whose expertise lies in probing the child's inner world. This
solution, however, is not without its problems. Uncritical delegation of
legal conflicts to social welfare professionals in juvenile court and in
civil commitment proceedings has led to egregious infringements of
children's constitutional rights.23 Even if the attorney avoids en-
trenched social welfare bureaucrats and seeks independent profession-
als, many of the problems confronted by parents and lawyers cannot be
overcome. 24 Moreover, a psychiatric interview can be frightening and
intrusive to children and their families, and can dredge up powerful
emotions that may lead to guilt and confusion on the part of the
20. The lawyer may be so predisposed to perceive or seek family harmony that he or
she cannot acknowledge conflict or fundamental misunderstanding between parent and
child. This impulse may be particularly strong when the legal problem has arisen outside
the family, and both parent and child seem united against a common enemy. Similar
problems can arise when the lawyer seeks to resolve the problem of client autonomy by
readily presuming that conflict exists between the child and parents or other authority, and
that this conflict should be resolved by the lawyer or the judicial system or by auxiliary,
independent psychiatric professionals.
21. Some theorists have suggested that lawyers and judges can be unilateral arbiters of
children's needs. See Freud, On the Difculties of Communicating with Children-The Lesser
Children in Chambers, in THE FAMILY & THE LAW 261, 262 (1965). However, the difficulties
that all adults face in communicating with children may be exacerbated by legal training,
which encourages the expectation that the litigant has readily ascertainable needs and goals.
See notes 116-19 & accompanying text infra.
22. Id. at 261-62.
23. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627-29, 631-34 (1979) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (erroneous civil commitment of children); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1,- 18-20 (1967) (abuses and inaccuracies in nonadversarial juvenile delinquency
proceedings).
24. See notes 37-41 & accompanying text infra.
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The inadequacy of these various partial solutions to the problems
of communicating with children may seem trivial when compared to
the magnitude of the evils that lawyers often must combat on behalf of
children. Brutality, isolation, and filth often pervade custodial institu-
tions, 26 and some children are egregiously abused by their parents.2 7
As painfully obvious as these violations may be, however, the appropri-
ate legal remedy is not apparent. Acceptable alternative residential fa-
cilities or caretakers may be difficult to identify, and drafting and
enforcing an injunctive decree against a bureaucracy that lacks the re-
sources or coordination necessary for compliance may be futile.
As all these modes of identifying and pursuing the client's interests
are seriously flawed, the attorney, insofar as is possible, must explain
the goals and limits of his or her representation to the child and family,
elicit information from the child and others that is relevant to a strategy
for litigation and remedy, and help the child and family endure the
uncertainty and duration of litigation.
Distinctive Barriers to the Representation of Handicapped Children
A child's difficulty with identifying, articulating, or pursuing viola-
tions of his or her legal fights can be exacerbated by a handicap that
directly delays or prevents cognitive, linguistic, or emotional develop-
ment. A mentally retarded or mentally ill child obviously has greater
difficulty in discerning which grievances to bring to a lawyer and how
to express them.28 Furthermore, even if the child's handicap does not
affect his or her mental ability, the status of disability can lead to as-
saults on a child's self-esteem that in turn inhibit his or her ability to
articulate and pursue a legal complaint and to interact with a lawyer.2 9
25. See Gorden, A Frame of Referencefor Communication, in THE LAWYERING PRO-
cEss 163 (G. Bellow & B. Moultin eds. 1978).
26. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1302-
10 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), decree modoftedon remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rock-
efeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387, 391
(M.D. Ala. 1972), a f'dsub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310-12 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 141-86 (1979). See generally CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (R. Heifer & C. Kemke
eds. 1976).
28. See Mickenberg, The Silent Clients Legal and Ethical Considerations in Represent-
ing Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. Rnv. 625 (1979).
29. B. WRIGHT, PHYSICAL DISABILITY-A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 51 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; see also J. GLIEDMAN & W. ROTH, THE UNEXPECTED MI-
NORITY: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN AMERICA 21 (1980) (study for the Carnegie Council
on Children) [hereinafter cited as GLIEDMAN & ROTH]. -
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Numerous intrafamilial, institutional, and societal practices and
expectations drain handicapped children of confidence and autonomy,
rendering these clients particularly reticent and vulnerable to the
abuses and distorted judgments of both caretakers and lawyers.30 The
lack of reciprocity and the social stigma associated with the develop-
ment of handicapped children can distort or arrest their moral develop-
ment, and can leave them unable to perceive that an abstract legal
order can vindicate their rights as against their caretakers or service-
providers.31 Society's general role expectations for handicapped per-
sons may subliminally affect a lawyer's perception of such a client.
The handicapped minority lacks certain resources that other mi-
nority groups have exploited to combat negative social and professional
stereotyping. Young members of racial, ethnic, and religious minority
groups have defended themselves to some extent with a sense of soli-
darity and pride, as transmitted by their families. Unless the handi-
capped child has a hereditary disability, neither parents nor progeny
share the social or physical experience of disability.32 Moreover, al-
though heroes of our culture have been handicapped, from Alexander
the Great to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, they rarely are held out
as models for the disabled.33 Their disabilities are either unknown or
regarded as embarrassing aberrations that miraculously were
overcome.
While lacking positive role models, handicapped children are con-
fronted with a set of demeaning role expectations based on their disa-
bilities. A recent study on American handicapped youngsters has
suggested that these expectations initially are similar to those for a sick
patient.34 The disabled child is exempted from normal role obligations,
and is not held responsible for the handicap, so long as he or she coop-
erates with professionals. As the caretaker begins to comprehend that
the "patient" will not get better, the disabled person may be regarded
as self-indulgent, parasitic, and pathetic. The child's subsequent self-
assertion may provoke the attitude that he or she is a "bad patient,"
such that a benevolent quarantine is followed by a more restrictive and
punitive isolation.
35
Furthermore, parents and other caretakers who effectively support
30. See WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 51; GLIEDMAN & ROTH, supra note 29, at 21.
31. GLIEDMAN & ROTH, supra note 29, at 89-95.
32. WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 19; see also GLIEDMAN & ROTH, supra note 29, at 29-30.
33. GLIEDMAN & ROTH, supra note 29, at 28-29.
34. Id. at 35-36 (citing T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 437-45 (1951)).
35. Id. at 41.
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and advocate handicapped children's legal rights may also be stigma-
tized by medical, social-work, and legal professionals. This stigmatiza-
tion may result from a feeling that the family is part of the cause of the
child's handicap, or that the parents ought to subordinate all other con-
cerns to care for the child.
36
A lawyer's relationship with handicapped children as clients is fur-
ther complicated by two related psychological responses to such chil-
dren: overprotection and rejection.37 Overprotection is perhaps a more
socially acceptable adult reaction to a child's handicap and resulting
dependency, but an equally common, though often unacknowledged,
response to a child's handicap is one of fear that the child will remain a
dependent for life.38 Initially, this can trigger revulsion in a parent,
service-provider, or lawyer. Revulsion may be followed in many in-
stances by overwhelming sympathy, protective care, and a desire to
36. "[In] the professional's relationship with the [handicapped] child's parents .... the
professional often expects the client to submit to the rules of the sick role--either because
the professional views the parent as part of the problem (perhaps because of incorrect child-
rearing practices, for example) or because the professional expects the parent to subordinate
all other concerns to making sure that the child meets the remedial goals set for him by the
professional." Id. at 48.
37. The responses of overprotection and rejection may have deep psychological roots.
A person with a severe disability, like one who is dying, insane, or in a state of extreme
dependency, threatens the distinction between self and other, which is at the core of our
sense of sanity. See R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN Doc-
TOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BURT]; GLIEDMAN & ROTH, supra
note 29, at 109; Gaylin, In the Beginning, in DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE 3-
4 (1978).
Psychologists have recognized that an infant's self/other distinction is the primary and
most significant developmental achievement, and that a breakdown in this distinction can
lead to psychosis. See, e.g., E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-48 (2d ed. 1963);
M. LEwIs, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT 28-30 (1971); Mahler, On Child
Psychosis and Schizophrenia: Autfistdc and Symbiotic Infantile Psychosis, in 7 THE PSYCHO-
ANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 286, 287-88 (1952). In the months immediately following
birth, all infants lack the ability to distinguish between self and other, between internal
impulses and external sources of gratification or frustration. H. LOEWALD, PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE HISTORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL 35-36 (1978). Once the self/other distinction is de-
veloped, and thereafter, there is a paradoxical desire on the part of caretakers, no less than
on the part of those for whom they care, to reenact and to repudiate the initial state of
dependency. BURT, supra, at 51-52; M. MAHLER, F. PINE & A. BERGMAN, THE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT: SYMBIOSIS AND INDIVIDUATION 76-78 (1975);
Gaylin, supra, at 22-24. The universal appeal of the infant's total dependency derives from
the simplicity and gratification associated with a state in which the rights and desires of
others need not be accommodated; instead, those others are incorporated into an indiscrimi-
nate world. On the other hand, the revulsion to dependency derives from experiences that
have taught us that, to approximate the gratification associated with the primal state in
which no self or other existed, the autonomy of others must be respected and our sense of
self must be developed. BuRT, supra, at 49-5 I.
38. See BURT, supra note 37, at 65.
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shelter the child.39 Both responses-rejection and overprotection-will
hinder the ability of the lawyer to communicate with the disabled child.
These responses differ from the more typical caretaker relationship
with a child, which allows adults to relive their own earlier dependence
while fostering independence in the child.40 If the caretaker feels un-
able to foster this independence, either because of the caretaker's limi-
tations or because of the child's disability, the caretaker may identify
with what he or she perceives to be the child's total dependency. This
identification can disturb any adult, particularly one whose own child-
hood was marked by traumatic stages of dependence and separation.41
Lawyers, other professionals, and administrators who deal with
these children on an intermittent basis are less likely to recognize both
the potential for independence and the possibility of perpetual depen-
dence.42 Lawyers and other professionals may find it uncomfortable to
listen to, and to spend extended periods of time with, handicapped chil-
dren and those who care for them. While the proper attitudes towards
such people cannot be legislated, public norms and institutions gov-
erning the conduct of lawyers in these cases can either encourage or
stifle an appropriate recognition of and response to the complex barri-
ers to understanding and to speaking for these clients.
Organizations of Caretakers and Service-Providers
Caretakers, whether families, teachers, or staff of residential insti-
tutions, play a crucial role in the life of a handicapped child. As the
child's closest and most constant contacts, caretakers serve an essential
but limited role as interpreter between the attorney and the child. The
likelihood of their continued association with the child after the lawyer
has completed rendering legal services requires their participation in
39. See Ferholt & Solnit, Counseling Parents of Mentally Retarded and Learning Disor-
dered Children, in HELPING PARENTS HELP THEIR CHILDREN 157, 170 (L. Arnold ed. 1978).
This conversion may occur partly as a result of guilt over one's prior revulsion to the child
and partly because of a fear of the cruelty that others who are similarly repelled may inflict
upon the disabled child. See WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 315-16.
40. BURT, supra note 37, at 51.
41. 1d. at 62. A parent may experience these paradoxical feelings of over-identification
and revulsion intensely. Clinicians have noted expressions of grief, rage, anxiety, and denial
following the birth of a deformed infant or at the first signs of a child's handicap. Ferholt &
Solnit, Counseling Parents of Mentally Retarded and Learning Disordered Children, in HELP-
ING PARENTS HELP THEIR CHILDREN 169-70 (L. Arnold ed. 1978); Solnit & Stark, Mourning
and the Birth of a Defective Child, in 16 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 523
(1961). On the other hand, the parent is in the best position to recognize subtle, gradual
assertions of independence even in the most crippled youngsters, and to replace fear with
hope. BURT, supra note 37, at 67.
42. See BURT, supra note 37, at 67.
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framing practical solutions to the client's problems. The attorney must
understand the motives and interests of these caretakers, both to pro-
vide effective representation to the individual client and to formulate
efficient institutional change.
Families, schools, and residential institutions share several attrib-
utes that must be recognized by the lawyer who is called upon to deal
with these groups. Their common attributes include decentralization,
low visibility, and self-sufficiency. 43 Moreover, parents, direct-care
staff in institutions, and teachers of the handicapped often feel iso-
lated, 4 and this feeling may be intensified by litigation or legislative
change that affects them or their organizations. Some of their defen-
siveness and feelings of inferiority may be related to the frustration and
guilt that can arise from working with severely handicapped young-
sters. Caretakers are likely to react to these youngsters in alternating or
simultaneous modes of overprotection and rejection. Both of these im-
pulses lead them to resist intervention by third parties.
45
Even in rejecting handicapped children, caretakers do not disclaim
responsibility for their children without ambivalence and guilt. Care-
takers may resent lawyers and new bureaucracies designed to protect
these children, in part because their intervention is legitimized by pub-
lic rituals that often appear to demonstrate the failure, abuse, or neglect
of traditional caretakers. Parents, teachers, and institutional staff who
work with handicapped youngsters have developed a variety of re-
sponses to the stigma placed on them because of their relationship to a
handicapped child, all of which may affect the lawyer's ability to repre-
sent the child.
43. Numerous examples of this insularity may be found in E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS
(1961), which defines a "total institution" as "a place of residence and work where a large
number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period
of time, together lead an enclosed, formally-administered way of life." Id. at xiii. In such
an institution, both residents and staff are induced to sustain a delicate and demoralizing set
of checks on themselves and others in the institution. This institutional world is shielded
from public scrutiny. Although families and schools may be more visible to the general
public, these.organizations have an internal culture and an inertial tendency that may be just
as strong as that of an asylum. .d.
44. See note 91 infra (isolation of special educators impedes mainstreaming legisla-
tion). See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979)
(motion by organization of institutional staff and parents of institutionalized retarded per-
sons opposing litigation brought by another parent organization to close the institution).
45. See note 49 infra (family resistance to intervention in decisions relating to medical
treatment of their children); note 63 infra (parental resistance to court-ordered closing of
institutions for their children); note 71 infra (institutional staff resistance to judicial decrees
affecting their workplace).
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Families and Parent Advocacy Organizations
Raising a handicapped child can give rise to tremendous guilt and
frustration. In response, parents may rely on their families and on par-
ent advocacy organizations. As members of these social structures, par-
ents have in varying circumstances served as agents, targets, and
mediators in legal disputes relating to their children. Lawyers cannot
understand the complex and varied responses of parents to litigation
involving their children without attempting to understand the dynam-
ics of families with handicapped children and the development of par-
ent advocacy groups.
Families
Two factors contribute to great resistance to legal representation in
families that include a handicapped child: societal norms and the
equally conservative and enduring loyalties and modes of interaction
within each family.46 Regarding themselves as uniquely qualified to
understand and help their disabled relative, family members may have
learned to trust only their own intuitions and patterns of interaction,
and to reject or mistrust other service-providers, such as lawyers, be-
cause of the transitory or coercive character of their services.
Added to this psychological impediment to a lawyer's intervention
into family matters are several important constitutional, statutory, and
ethical restrictions. The expanding constitutional doctrine of family
autonomy 47 recently led the Supreme Court to uphold parents' right to
commit their minor children to mental institutions without a hearing. 48
In a highly publicized recent case, parents of a retarded teenage boy,
46. See generally S. FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO (J.
Strachey trans. 1966) (social organizations and relationships replicate primal family dynam-
ics); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 18
(1973) (same). Cf. C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED
(1977) (literature review and criticism of popular and social science premises on enduring
family ties).
47. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating city ordinance
that prohibited extended-family households); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (up-
holding Amish parents' right to supplant compulsory education); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (father's right to custody of illegitimate children). Cf. Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-47 (1977) (limiting certain liberty interests to natural, not
foster, parents).
48. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979). Some critics have charged that, in
such cases, the Court has used the rhetoric of family autonomy as a subterfuge to support
other established institutions of communal authority, such as mental hospitals, social service
agencies, and schools, that in other cases have conflicted with and prevailed against the
authority of parents. See Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 329, 331-
45.
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institutionalized from birth, were granted the right to withhold life-sus-
taining medical care from their child despite the strenuous opposition
of the state.
49
In spite of these limitations, lawyers' participation in matters that
can interfere with families is unlikely to decline in the near future.
Constitutional safeguards for the sexual privacy of minors in the ab-
sence of parental consent have been established by courts, and will con-
tinue to be enforced by lawyers.50 In this regard, restrictions on the
49. Bothman v. Warren B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 949 (1980). The treatment was finally ordered upon a showing that the boy effec-
tively had another family, a couple who had become his "psychological parents" and thus
acquired the power to consent to treatment. Guardianship of Phillip Becker, No. 101981,
mem. op. (Santa Clara Super. Ct., Cal. Aug. 7, 1981). The trial court judge's order for
surgery has been stayed pending a bitterly contested appeal. Guardianship of Phillip Beck-
er, Heath v. Becker etal., No. 53419 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Nov. 18, 1981) (granting writ of superse-
deas pending appeal, staying the trial court's order for heart catheterization).
Paradoxically, both the original Bothman decision permitting the boy's natural parents
to withhold treatment, and the later Becker decision authorizing treatment, are consistent
with principles set forth by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, who recommend that the following
standard govern such cases: "Refusal by parents to authorize medical care when (1) medical
experts agree that treatment is nonexperimental and appropriate for the child, and (2) denial
of that treatment would result in death, and (3) the anticipated result of treatment is what
society would want for every child-a chance for normal healthy growth or a life worth
living-should be a ground for intervention." J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 91 (1979). This standard would permit parents
to withhold life-sustaining treatment for their child whenever they feel that the child's life is
not worth living. The authors justify this result by arguing that, as there is no societal con-
sensus on these issues, "parents must remain free of coercive state intervention," for no
others have more responsibility or concern for the child. Id. at 94. The state could over-
come this strong presumption in favor of parents only if it could "demonstrate its capacity
for making such 'unwanted' children 'wanted' ones." Id. at 97.
In light of the declining resources available to serve such children, and the magnitude
of the costs, there would be many cases in which the state would fail to meet this burden. In
such cases, parents would be free to authorize death for a child who, in their eyes, did not
have a life worth living.
In the Bothman case, which pitted the natural parents against the state, the state was
unable to overcome this heavy presumption in favor of parental control. However, in the
Becker case, life-sustaining treatment was finally ordered for the same child, because the
other adult couple, who proved that they were the boy's "psychological parents" because
they satisfied his emotional needs while the natural parents did not, favored treatment.
Becker, No. 53419, at 5-6 & n.21. The trial court judge in Becker expressly derived this
standard from Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's earlier work, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 98 (1973). Neither the Bothman nor the Becker cases, nor the seminal works of
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, acknowledge the problems inherent in designating one party
only-whether natural parent, psychological parent, or the state-as the sole interpreter of
and spokesperson for a silent child.
50. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating state prohi-
bition of sale of contraceptives to minors); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (overruling state statute requiring parental approval of minor's abortion); cf. H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding state statute requiring physician to notify parents
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sterilization of mentally retarded adolescents may prove particularly
problematic for their families, who may feel unable to train these
youngsters to understand and control their sexual impulses and to
avoid exploitation.5 1
Even more divisive, and equally unavoidable, is intrafamilial legal
conflict that arises in cases of alleged abuse and neglect. While such
cases are not unique to handicapped children, these youngsters more
frequently may be victims of such mistreatment because of parents' in-
creased anxiety and intensified sense of helplessness with disabled chil-
dren.5 2 Although the desirability of legal intervention in cases of
neglect and less severe abuse is controversial, 53 an increasing number
of states have adopted statutes requiring lawyers to represent children
who are the alleged victims of abuse and neglect.5 4
Finally, in a number of situations, parents are not adverse to their
children but instead seek legal assistance to protect or expand their
children's liberties and entitlements. Even when parents initiate litiga-
tion to enhance family solidarity by seeking government benefits or the
removal of government burdens, the relief that they seek may have par-
adoxical effects. For instance, parents of noninstitutionalized children
who support efforts to reform or close a deplorable institution to which
their children might otherwise be sent in the future may find that for-
mer residents of the institution, released under a decree that the parents
supported, compete with their own children for scarce community
resources. 55
Lawyers should support parents' desires to change the social struc-
of minor's abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 620 (1979) (construing state statute to allow
independent judicial approval of minor's abortion as alternative to parental consent). More
than Danforth, Baird and Matheson seem to ensure a continuous flow of litigation on family
conflicts over a minor's abortion.
51. See Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 363-64 (D. Conn. 1978).
52. Cf. BURT, supra note 37, at 65 (typical response to physical deformity or mental
disability is one of profound pessimism similar to that which characterizes abusive parents).
53. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 75-90 (1979); cf. IJA/ABA JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE & NEGLECT 55 (tent. draft 1977) (discussing
hazards of predicting the degree of abuse required before legal intervention advisable).
54. Fraser, supra note 17, at 42-43. These statutes require that an attorney represent
the child's interests that appear to oppose the interests of the family. Id.
55. This apparently is occurring in the implementation of the decree in Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D..Pa. 1978), rey'd, 449 U.S. 980
(1981). Interview with Special Master Carla Morgan, in King of Prussia, Pa. (Nov. 28,
1980); interview with L. Steuart Brown, former president of the Pennsylvania Association
for Retarded Children (PARC) and former member of the Board of Directors of the Na-
tional Association for Retarded Children (NARC), in Roslyn, Pa. (Jan. 24, 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Brown Interview].
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tures that influence or dominate their children's lives, but should cau-
tion parents that the reforms they seek may lead to unintended and
adverse consequences. In some cases, the lawyer's prior litigation expe-
rience or careful study of precedents56 may reveal some of the problem-
atic consequences of the kind of remedy sought by parents.
Parent Advocacy Organizations
Many parents of disabled youngsters have looked outside their
families for social support and political power. Since World War II
many parents have joined voluntary organizations to provide services
and support legal reform on behalf of their disabled children.5 7 The
experience of parent advocacy groups illustrates the conflict and con-
tradictions that permeate legal representation of the handicapped child.
These organizations need lawyers not only to represent them in
litigation, but also to counsel them in resolving internal policy disputes
and in planning a strategy of legislative, administrative, and judicial
action for law reform. Whether serving as an advisor or an advocate,
the lawyer who represents a parent advocacy organization may con-
front three significant dilemmas: (1) the conflict between the organiza-
tion's advocacy and service functions, (2) the attempt to support public
employees and programs and at the same time to seek potentially con-
tradictory reform, and (3) the need to compete against other groups of
parents advocating different public policies. Parent leaders and mem-
bers are likely to confront these dilemmas with ambivalence and uncer-
tainty, providing their lawyers with conflicting information.
Examples of some of these problems may be drawn from recent
developments within the National Association for Retarded Children
(NARC), a large parent advocacy organization. During the past thirty
years, state and local NARC chapters (ARCs) have played a central
role in legislation" and litigation establishing rights and services for
mentally retarded children.58 Thus, an analysis of the state and local
56. In this respect, even more useful than relevant case reports is the growing body of
scholarship on implementation of judicial decrees in this area. See, e.g., Kirp, Kuriloff &
Buss, Legal Mandates and Organizational Change, in 2 IssuEs IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF
CHILDREN 319 (N. Hobbes ed. 1975) (implementation ofjudicial and statutory mandates for
special education reform); Note, Implementation Pioblems in Institutional Reform Litigation,
,91 HARV. L. REv. 428 (1977); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree
erdering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
57. According to the most recent estimate, the national membership of all ARCs is
approximately 200,000. Telephone interview with Betty Stevens, NARC Executive Officer,
(June 17, 1982), citing the unpublished 1981 ARC Annual Report.
58. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (deinsti-
tutionalization) (Pennsylvania ARC as named plaintiff); Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Chil-
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NARC chapters, as principal catalysts and as potential resisters of legal
change for disabled youngsters, illustrates some potential conflicts.
A significant number of ARCs have operated services, including
education, recreation, and group homes, for many years. 59 These pro-
grams now have become established in the service-delivery system for
the mentally retarded. 60 The advocacy function of the ARCs thus is
compromised to the extent that they oversee those public agencies that
provide funds or support for such service programs. Conversely, ARC
services, and the constituency that they serve, may be reduced when
resources are diverted for advocacy functions, or when such advocacy
leads to the public provision of alternative services.
61
Parent organizations may have particular difficulty in determining
whether they will serve as allies or adversaries of those public officials
who serve disabled youngsters. Parents' relationship with these public-
sector benefactors is one of dependency mixed with resentment. Rais-
ing a disabled child, whether at home or in an institution, is an obliga-
tion that few parents can fulfill without public support, particularly if
specialized medical care, schooling, or architectural adaptations to a
home are required.
The initial strategy of many parent groups has been to lobby for
more and better personnel and services, and to support the public em-
ployees who provide the services. 62 Parents have feared that if these
dren v. Cohn, No. C-78-0157-L(A), slip. op. (W.D. Ky. 1980) (deinstitutionalization);
Washington Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Thomas, Civ. No. 79-1235V (W.D. Wash., Mar.
14, 1980) (same); Connecticut Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Mansfield Training School,
Civ. No. H-78-653 (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 1979) (same); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (improving institutional condi-
tions); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (right to education).
59. Brown Interview, supra note 55. Nevertheless, official NARC policy provides that
chapters may provide direct services only as part of pilot or demonstration projects to en-
courage public provision of such services. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITI-
ZENS, POLICIES, CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS 3-1 (1979) (policy resolution adopted in 1965)
(on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
60. Brown Interview, supra note 55. Official NARC policy, however, is to avoid en-
trenchment. Id.
61. For example, in 1971, the Pennsylvania ARC brought a landmark suit against the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that led to a consent decree ending the exclusion of handi-
capped children from public schools, until then sanctioned by state statute. Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The success
of this advocacy led to a decrease in the Pennsylvania ARC's membership and fund-raising,
because parents who previously sent their retarded children to ARC programs thereafter
could enroll those youngsters in public schools. Brown Interview, supra note 55.
62. Brown Interview, supra note 55; see L. LIPMAN & I. GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCA-
TION: ANATOMY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 10-11 (1973) (early activities of NARC).
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public employees were maligned, the state might put the children back
in the parents' homes or out on the streets.63 When public funds for the
mentally retarded began to increase in the 1960's, however, the per-
formance of some public organizations, recipients of these funds, failed
to improve commensurately. Leaders of some ARC chapters thus re-
sorted to litigation and have attempted to persuade other chapters to
join this strategy. 64
Finally, as disagreements over both strategy and goals have sur-
faced within NARC, rival parent organizations have been established
to oppose the deinstitutionalization efforts of some of the ARCs, and to
challenge NARC's position as the preeminent representative of the
mentally retarded.6 5 Thus, the conflicting loyalties of parents can be
expressed not only in intraorganizational conflict, but in a proliferation
of organizations, each group advocating different policies that are said
to serve the true interests of disabled youngsters.
At a minimum, then, when a parent organization seeks structural
change through litigation, its attorney must prepare it for internal and
external political disputes and heated conflicts over class certification
and party status.66 The lawyer should also seek to mediate conflicts
and to identify areas of common interest among rival parent groups
63. This view has characterized many ARC chapters until recently. When more ag-
gressive chapters later sought structural changes through deinstitutionalization suits, other
parent organizations, not affiliated with ARCs, continued to support public caretakers by
intervening on behalf of the state defendants. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)
(affirming denial of intervention motion of Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association, an organi-
zation seeking to prevent closing of Pennhurst); Washington Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Thomas, Civ. No. 79-1235V (W.D. Wash., Mar. 14, 1980) (oral argument and bench ruling
on parent-intervenors' motion to dismiss Washington ARC as class representative) (tran-
script at 10-16); Frohboese & Sales, Parental Opposition to Deinstitutionalization, 4 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1980).
64. At the annual NARC Convention of 1980, leaders of those chapters that had
brought deinstitutionalization suits introduced a resolution in support of their efforts. After
bitter debate, the resolution was resoundingly defeated. Minutes of the NARC Annual
Business Session (Oct. 10, 1980) (Resolution No. 7, articulating an "imperative" for commu-
nity living facilities, defeated 4,599 to 1,278). These internal debates should not stifle the
efforts of advocates to help their clients and others agree on a remedy or policy. However,
lawyers should not expect parents to speak unequivocally on issues that necessarily provoke
personal ambivalence and interpersonal moral choice.
65. See note 63 supra.
66. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-11 (3d Cir.
1979), rep'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Washington Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Thomas, Civ.
No. 79-1235V (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 1980); Memorandum of Proposed Intervenors Mans-
field Parents Ass'n, Connecticut Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Mansfield Training School,
Civ. No. H-78-653 (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 1979).
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and public employees, while recognizing that any consensus among
these variegated organizations will be tenuous.
Institutional Staff
Staff in residential institutions, like parents, carry a social stigma
for their work with handicapped children. 67 Disrespected in society as
social custodians, they generally earn less than half the salary of sanita-
tion workers.68 Staff members therefore may turn against the institu-
tional and state hierarchy to develop independent, organized resistance
through unions.
Another layer of resistance to legal intervention thus develops as
workers' perceptions of legal change are filtered through three compli-
cated, conservative, and often conflicting bureaucracies: the state de-
partment that operates the facility, the institution's administration, and
the union. Each of these organizations may send conflicting informa-
tion to employees. State officials generally have been the most resistant
to any sort of externally imposed legal change, particularly if they fear
that new burdens will be imposed without additional resources. In
contrast, superintendents of institutions in some cases may welcome lit-
igation as a source of leverage to demand increased funding from the
state, and may tacitly encourage employees to cooperate in such law-
suits. 69 Independent employees and unions have encouraged lawsuits
67. The internal dynamics of the institution can reinforce this sense of inferiority.
Whether such staff see themselves as active agents or as powerless witnesses to the abuse and
regression commonly experienced by residents of custodial institutions, these workers com-
monly undergo a demoralization similar to that experienced by residents of such institu-
tions. Staff may respond to this assault on their sense of status and morality by adopting the
norms of the institution that at first seemed so perverse. Initially, such uncritical identifica-
tion with institutional norms may be a grudging concession to a powerful hierarchy; eventu-
ally, this may be replaced by voluntary consent to a system that has engendered loyalty and
legitimacy. The hostility and aggression that patients and the outside world inflict upon staff
are returned in kind, but staff can take refuge in an institutional ethos which provides order,
purpose, and social support. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 87-89 (1961).
68. For instance, in the San Francisco/Oakland area, the average hourly wage for non-
professional aides in nursing and personal care facilities is $4.19; for refuse collectors,
$11.87. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, B.L.S. INDUSTRY WAGE SURVEY: NURSING AND PERSONAL
CARE FACILITIES, SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND 4 (1981); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, B.L.S. IN-
DUSTRY WAGE SURVEY: REFUSE HAULING, SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND (1982).
69. The chief executive offices of Minnesota's institutions for handicapped children, for
example, have strongly supported the plaintiffs claims to improve conditions and reduce
population of these institutions. Interview with Luther Granquist, plaintiffs attorney in
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aird, 550 F.2d 1132 (8th Cir. 1977), and
Welsch v. Noot, Civ. No. 4-72-451 (D. Minn. Sept. 15, 1980), in Minneapolis, Minn. (Nov.
17, 1980); see also Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization." The Promise of the Pennhurst




seeking to improve conditions within institutions, but have opposed ef-
forts to reduce or eliminate the number of residents in institutions.
70
Even when lawsuits are confined to issues supported by most workers,
these workers sometimes resist continuous judicial supervision of their
workplace.
71
A critical task of the lawyer is to apprise these workers of the pro-
spective costs, benefits, delays, and uncertainties of litigation. Most
lawyers would perform these functions if they were representing a
union, but many institutional workers are not represented by unions.
72
To serve the interests of both private plaintiffs and public defendants in
these disputes, direct-care workers should receive knowledgeable and
sensitive representation. If independent representation of staff is pre-
vented by the judge, or if it is impractical under the circumstances, law-
yers for the parties still should seek to communicate with the staff and
to identify areas of mutual interest.73 These workers are indispensable
sources of information regarding individual clients and institutional
conditions, and they can aid or hinder the implementation of a reme-
dial decree.
Teachers
Public schools, perhaps more than any other social structure, have
been the target of litigation and legislation undertaken on behalf of
handicapped children. Advocates have sought to improve the accuracy
of assessments and the quality of special services for these youngsters,
to integrate or "mainstream" them into classes with nonhandicapped
70. Interview with Luther Granquist, plaintiffs attorney in Welsch v. Likins, 373 F.
Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aj'd, 550 F.2d 1132 (8th Cir. 1977), and Welsch v. Noot, Civ.
No. 4-72-451 (D. Minn. Sept. 15, 1980), in Minneapolis, Minn. (Nov. 17, 1980).
71. See Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institu-
tional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1368 (1975) (in landmark right-to-treatment suit initially
brought by institutional employees, remedial enforcement came to be resented and ob-
structed by staff).
72. For instance, approximately 30-35% of all workers at public residential institutions
for the mentally retarded, and more than 80% of the staff at private facilities for the retarded,
are not represented by a union or similar organization. Telephone interview with Louis
Nayman, specialist in mental retardation, American Federation of State, County and Mu-
nicipal Employees, June 17, 1982.
73. Lawyers may be significantly constrained in these efforts by legal ethics and judicial
resistance. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(2) (1979)
(forbids advising persons who have "a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the
interests of his client"). Furthermore, judges may impose standing or remedial bars against
attempts of plaintiff lawyers to assert the rights or accommodate the interests of unrepre-
sented third-party staff. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84,
113 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (reversal of trial court order
requiring defendants to provide alternative employment due to closing of institution).
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children, and to protect their rights through special procedural safe-
guards. These goals, first adopted in federal court decrees74 and state
statutes75 in the early 1970's, are codified in the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (the Act).76 Since the Act went into
effect in late 1977, public schools have been required, through adminis-
trative action and litigation, to restructure significantly the substance
and procedures of their special education programs. 7 In enforcing the
rights established under the Act, lawyers must recognize both the type
of discretion granted to, and the kinds of constraints imposed upon, the
classroom teacher, whose capacity to facilitate or obstruct legal change
often is underestimated.
The teacher's broad discretion in providing education derives both
from the decentralized nature of public education in this country and,
paradoxically, from recent attempts to impose a broad array of uniform
state and federal standards on the public schools.78 Autonomy for local
public schools is an important American value; this independence ex-
tends to individual classrooms under theories of pluralism and aca-
demic freedom.79 Although there are extensive state and federal
regulations regarding education for the handicapped, 80 the laws are
74. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
75. The most significant of these was Chapter 766 of the Acts of 1972, Commonwealth
of Massachusetts (codified at MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 766, §§ 1-14 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1978)).
76. Pub. L. No. 94-142,20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-61 (West Supp. 1980); see Board of Educ.
v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
77. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), a f'd sub nom.
Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1109 (1981) (re-
quiring schools to provide summer program for certain severely handicapped children);
Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (requiring teacher in-service
training on mainstreaming, provision of advocacy for parents and children, improved notice
of parental rights); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978) (enjoining expulsion
of learning-disabled child). See generally Hyatt, Litigating the Rights of Handicapped Chil-
dren to an Appropriate Education: Procedures and Remedies, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1981);
Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education of All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1103 (1979).
78. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 2734, 2739 (conditions on federal grants for schools in low-
income areas, and provision for individualized education plans for educationally deprived
students); 20 U.S.C. § 3223(a)(4), (b) (establishing curricular and administrative conditions
and models for bilingual education); 5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 200-1651 (regulating pupil
admission, duties, privileges, health, safety, testing, and graduation).
79. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 103-06 (1968) (dictum); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
80. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.754 (1981); 5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3000-3054
(1982).
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open to interpretation and are enforced only sporadically.8' Teachers
and administrators are given broad discretion to interpret and balance
requirements that seem to conflict or to be too demanding.
82
A consensus among teachers on policy issues relating to disabled
children does seem to exist, premised on a recognition of the children's
distinctive needs, and the conflicts, uncertainties, and costs involved in
meeting these needs.83 Lawyers who fail to demonstrate a practical
sensitivity to these conflicts are likely to be ineffective in their attempts
to restructure education for the handicapped. Officials of state and lo-
cal school systems and national organizations of educators expressed
strong support for the Act prior to its enactment. 84 They welcomed the
Act as a source of funds to educate a previously excluded or under-
served group of students, for whom an increasing number of new rights
had already been established under court decrees and state and federal
statutes.85
As the Act has been implemented, educators have been disturbed
most by the requirements for mainstreaming and the provision of "re-
81. See Note, Enforcing the Right to an '"ppropriate" Education: The Education of All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1103 (1979).
82. See Weatherley & Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation:
Implementing Special Education Reform, 47 HARv. EDUC. REv. 171, 193 (1977).
83. An important contrast between teachers and direct-care workers lies in the fact that
teachers do not provide a counterforce to the formal hierarchy in education in the same way
that unions have challenged the hierarchy governing residential institutions. Two of the
most influential organizations of educators, the National Education Association (NEA) and
the Council for Exceptional Children (CEC), include administrators and school special serv-
ice professionals, such as psychologists and social workers, as well as teachers. The most
significant union comprised exclusively of teachers, the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT), has taken positions on special education which differ little from those of the NEA or
CEC.
Each of these groups has expressed strong reservations about the integration, or "main-
streaming," of handicapped students into regular classrooms without adequate special serv-
ices, and in light of resource constraints on newly mandated educational services for the
group. See Oversight on Education of41l Handicapped Children, 1980, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm on Labor & Public Weplare, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (July 31, 1980) (statement of A. Shanker, AFT President) (unpublished draft at 7-
11); Ryan, Mainstreaming, TODAY'S EDUCATION, Mar.-Apr. 1976, at 1 (NEA President).
84. See, e.g., Education for 411 Handicapped Children, 1975, Hearings on S.6 Before the
Subcomtr. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comma on Labor & Public Welfare, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 307-27 (statement of CEC), 328-35 (statement of AFT), 349-54 (statement of NEA)
(1975).
85. Id.; see, e.g., Pub. L. No. 91-230, Apr. 13, 1970, 84 Stat. 175; Pub. L. No. 93-380,
Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 581 (Education of the Handicapped Acts of 1970 and 1974, codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.); Chapter 766 of the Acts of 1972, Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts (codified at MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 766, §§ 1-14 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978)); Mills v.
Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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lated services."' 6 Teachers' objections to lawyers' attempts to enforce
such controversial requirements must be understood both as a protec-
tive response of a profession with a vested interest in the status quo,
and as a rational response to the costs and lack of resources for imple-
menting the requirements.
Special educators and regular classroom teachers have an interest
in maintaining classrooms that are segregated according to disability.
These teachers' training, and the structure of the schools in which they
work, sustain biases against mainstreaming. Separate courses of col-
lege and postgraduate education have divided special educators from
regular classroom teachers,87 and this separation is maintained by the
structure of most public schools.8 8 Special educators are physically and
socially isolated from regular teachers. Teachers of the handicapped
generally are accountable to a different bureaucracy, 89 and generally
are members of a different professional organization. 90 The isolation of
any classroom teacher must be understood as frustrating; the loneliness
of the special educator is more profound.91 An important weakness of
86. See, e.g., Oversight on Education of All Handicapped Children, 1980, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public We//are,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 31, 1980) (statement of A. Shanker, AFT President) (unpublished
draft at 7-11); Ryan, Mainstreaming, TODAY'S EDUCATION, Mar.-Apr. 1976, at I (NEA Pres-
ident).
Educators have argued that these requirements either should be funded properly or
should be relaxed. Oversight on Education of All Handicapped Children, 1980, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 31, 1980) at 12; Oversight on Education of All Handicapped Chil-
dren, 1979, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor
& Public Welfare, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 921-22 (1979) (statement of R. Scanlon, Secretary of
Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania).
87. See S. SARASON & J. DORIS, EDUCATIONAL HANDICAP, PUBLIC POLICY AND SO-
CIAL HISTORY 321-22, 359-60 (1979).
88. Id. at 359-61.
89. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STATS. § 19-575c (1982) (establishing "special school dis-
tricts" for the mentally retarded, operated by the state rather than local educational author-
ity); cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 9-964(7) (Purdon Supp. 1982) (classes for "exceptional"
children operated by regional "intermediate units" rather than local school boards).
90. Special educators are represented locally and nationally by the CEC. The Council
has no affiliation with NEA or AFT.
91. "[Special] classes tend to be viewed as alien bodies in the school culture, with the
result that children in these classes, as well as their teachers, feel different and apart from the
school. The relationships between the regular and special class teachers are not made any
easier by the fact that special classes contain fewer children than the regular ones, ie., too
many regular class teachers think that the special class teacher has an easy time of it. In
addition, the special class in a school presents many problems to the principal who has no
competence (he feels) with special education and does not know how to relate to the special
class teacher or his supervisor. Underlying all this are two important characteristics of the
school culture: the higher a child's intelligence level the more valued he is as a person. ...
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the enforcement of the Act has been the failure to correct these under-
lying structural causes of segregation. While the Act provides authority
for the changes in "personnel development," 92 this provision has re-
ceived less attention than have formal procedures for parental
complaints.
A costly substantive requirement of the Act is the school's duty to
provide "related services." Such services include audiology, psycholog-
ical counseling, social work services, and diagnostic medical services.
93
Some courts have further required that schools pay for certain young-
sters to receive residential care,94 summer classes,9
5 catheterization, 96
medical monitoring for epileptic seizures, 97 and interpreters for the
deaf.98 Apart from practical and fiscal constraints, teachers may resent
"related services" because they believe that education should be con-
fined to conventional academic and vocational subjects, and should not
include basic living skills, such as using a fork or toileting, and social
and psychological services. While educators' organizations have ac-
knowledged that the concept of education must be broadened and
redefined with respect to the handicapped, 99 it seems likely that many
teachers are more skeptical. Fearing the dependency of these children,
teachers may retreat to a narrowly defined concept of the function of
education.
Substantial costs also are involved in achieving mainstreaming, in-
cluding costs associated with teacher training and the provision of spe-
cialized services in a multiplicity of regular classrooms, rather than in
and that one needs a special psychological theory for different kinds of special children
... ." S. SARASON, THE CULTURE OF SCHOOLS AND THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE 156 n.2
(1971).
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1980).
93. See id. §§ 1401(17), 1412(2)(C) (West Supp. 1980).
94. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1981); North v. Board of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C.
1979).
95. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), af'd sub nom. Battle v. Com-
monwealth, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1109 (1981).
96. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.W. Va. 1976) (decided under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). But see Sherer
v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
97. North v. Board of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
98. See Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aft'd, 632 F.2d
945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). This is one example of what various courts
have ordered under the Act.
99. See Educationfor 411Handicapped Children, 197, Hearings on S.6 Before the Sub-
comm on the Handicapped of the Senate Comrz on Labor & Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 307-27 (statement of CEC), 328-35 (statement of AFT), 349-54 (statement of NEA)
(1975).
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concentrated special classrooms and schools. l° Critics charge that
schools unwilling or unable to assume these expenses place handi-
capped youngsters in regular classrooms, in which they are more stig-
matized and more poorly educated than in special programs.' 0 '
Schools lack the funds to perform the myriad services required under
the Act, lack sufficient internal expertise, and cannot easily obtain these
services from health and welfare agencies. 10
2
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Board of Education v.
Rowley 03 is unlikely to alleviate these allocational and normative con-
flicts. In Rowley the lower courts had ordered the school board to pro-
vide a sign language interpreter for a deaf child who was able to
comprehend less than half of classroom speech even with special equip-
ment provided by the board. 104 Reversing this decree, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Act's guarantee of "appropriate education" does
not set a substantive standard of equal educational opportunity, but
rather requires "a basic floor of opportunity" consisting of "access to
specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child."'O
5
The fact that the child received passing grades was important evidence
that this standard had been met.
0 6
This holding, and the Court's ruling that courts must show defer-
ence to state administrative hearing officers in these cases, 107 may make
it more difficult for parents of mainstreamed handicapped children to
contest their children's educational programs. However, the opinion
says nothing about more severely handicapped children who cannot be
mainstreamed, nor about the difficult distinction between educational
and medical or social services.
By suggesting that schools can satisfy their duty to mainstreamed
100. See note 86 supra. Other major costs required by the Act include the time involved
in preparing and conferring over the student's individualized education plan, as well as
other due process procedures, and efforts to identify and evaluate children with disabilities.
See 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1414(a)(5) (individualized education plan), 1415 (due process proce-
dures), 1414(a)(1)(A) (identification and evaluation) (West Supp. 1980).
101. See note 86 supra.
102. Oersight on Education ofAll Handicapped Children, 1979, Hearings be/ore the Sub-
comm. on the Handicappedof the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public We/fare, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 921-22 (1979) (statement of R. Scanlon, Secretary of Education, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania).
103. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
104. Id. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting); see 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980); 483 F. Supp. 528
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
105. 102 S. Ct. at 3048 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 3049.
107. Id. at 3051.
[Vol. 33
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
handicapped children under the Act, while leaving open the possibility
that schools may have greater duties to nonmainstreamed children,
0 8
the decision may lead to more mainstreaming. This may in turn en-
courage integration but further discourage inadequately prepared,
overtaxed regular classroom teachers.
Lawyers litigating rights under the Act have acknowledged and
sought to remedy these allocational and policy problems only insofar as
they affect the individual or class client. 0 9 While the lawyer's duty of
loyalty within our adversary system does not extend to noncients, it is
necessary to recognize the compromises, costs, and consequences of le-
gal action which the client may not anticipate. If the client is a child,
the quality of his or her school environment depends in large measure
on the attitude of the teacher. If legal change is sought and imple-
108. See id. at 3049.
109. The resource allocation problems that arise in the special education context are also
central to many other types of litigation on behalf of handicapped persons, including law-
suits relating to the accessibility of buildings and transportation for the physically handi-
capped, and deinstitutionalization of the mentally disabled. See Heal, Sigelman & Switzky,
Research on Community Residential41ternativesfor the Mentally Retarded, 9 INT'L REV. OF
RESEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION 209 (1978); Rose-Ackerman, Norms & Normaliza-
tion: From Consensus to Conflict in Public Policy Toward the Mentally Retarded (unpub-
lished manuscript 16 n.63) (1982) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). Plaintiffs in such
cases have argued that the long-term gains to the handicapped, both in terms of measurable
productivity and intangible self-respect and happiness, more than outweigh the costs. Even
if this is the case, lawyers and other advocates for the handicapped must confront the sub-
stantial and immediate costs of the rights that they seek. This represents a critical difference
from advocacy on behalf of blacks, women, and other groups subject to discrimination.
Aronow, The Implementation of Section 504: A Re-evaluation of the Dynamics of Federal
Policymaking 7-9 (unpublished paper 1980) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
These groups can select, as targets for antidiscrimination litigation, practices and classi-
fications that are inspired solely by prejudice, and that hinder efficiency as well as equality.
Only after years of litigation, legislation, and popular ferment have advocates challenged
practices for which the link to discriminatory intent is more attenuated, and the immediate
social cost of the remedies more substantial. On the other hand, the handicapped have an
advantage over other minority groups in that disabilities cut across class lines, and have not
inspired rationalized, ideological discrimination comparable to racism or sexism. The more
subtle and less conscious nature of discrimination on the basis of handicap hardly makes it
less invidious, yet it may make it more difficult to identify and challenge.
Moreover, the handicapped rights movement has lacked the incubation period that ena-
bled other civil rights groups to muster support and gain legitimacy. Many handicapped
people cannot be educated or employed without special treatment (whether a ramp to a
building, a hearing aid, or special remedial training), so that classifications based on handi-
cap are not facially suspect in the way that those based on sex or race are. Moreover, the
cost of remedying discrimination against the handicapped is substantial and apparent from
the very outset. The offsetting long-term social benefits of these remedies may be regarded
by judges and legislators as too speculative or remote to justify the immediate political and
economic costs.
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mented in such a way as to antagonize or overburden teachers, the
costs to the client and to society can be substantial.
Part Two: Standards for Representation of Disabled Children
Professional ethical standards for lawyers in all contexts currently
are being reassessed, as the American Bar Association debates ratifica-
tion of the Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. 10 Draft Model Rule 1.14, 1 ' and current Ethical Consideration
7-12,112 are addressed specifically to representation of clients who are
severely disabled or are minors. Other provisions of the current Model
Code of Professional Responsibility and the proposed Rules relate gen-
erally to lawyer-client consultation and conifict of interest.' 1 3 The cur-
rent and proposed standards, however, are fundamentally inadequate.
To represent the disabled youngster effectively, an attorney must
develop both an awareness of the unique barriers to substantial com-
munication and a process for coping with these problems. The attorney
should develop the capacity to identify and to mediate the difficult and
latent conflicts that can arise between lawyer and client, parent and
client, or between one or more of these and an advocacy organization.
These skills cannot be mandated effectively by professional rules; an
orderly framework, however, can guide and reinforce the need for re-
sponsive communications and conflict management. Adherence to a
well-reasoned set of guidelines can aid the conscientious lawyer to rep-
resent this client effectively.
This Article, therefore, proposes the following three duties:
(1) The duty to consult with the child, his or her parents or
guardians, and at least one service-provider, independent professional,
or member of an advocacy organization; when in litigation, to report
such consultation to the trial judge for review and approval.
(2) The duty to identify conflicts among counsel, the child, and
his or her guardian, to mediate such conflicts whenever possible, and to
obtain informed consent to the continued representation of conflicting
110. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Discussion Draft 1980) were promul-
gated in 1980 to replace the current Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1979).
111. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
112. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1977).
113. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (consultation with client),
DR 5-101 to -106 and EC 5-1 to -24 (conifict of interest) (1977); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.4 (communication with client), 1.7-1.9 (conffict of interest) (Pro-
posed Final Draft 1981).
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parties; when in litigation, to report such conflicts and the consent to
the trial judge for review and approval.
(3) The duty to negotiate with adversary parties and with third
parties who may have a substantial interest in or impact on the legal
action sought by the client.
These proposed standards are not offered as a definitive solution to
the problems of representing handicapped children, for these problems
are to a high degree intractable. There is a risk that codifying norms of
advocacy may lead some attorneys to oversimplify or obfuscate impor-
tant ethical dilemmas by ritualistic, unreflective adherence to the rules
rather than by responsible, personal, moral choice. Ambiguous, inap-
propriate, or contradictory standards, however, such as now exist under
professional norms and state law, can lead to uncertainty or oblivi-
ousness to the distinctive advocacy challenge that these clients present.
The current debate over redrafting the norms of professional responsi-
bility provides an opportunity to define this challenge more precisely,
by identifying both the inherent impediments to, and the affirmative
requirements of, effective representation of disabled children.
The Duty of Consultation
The current and draft codes of legal ethics do not expressly require
that the attorney consult with anyone other than the client or, if the
client is incompetent, the client's guardian. The preferred mechanism
for communicating with disabled and minor clients is to let their legal
guardians speak for them or to seek appointment of a guardian ad i-
tern. 114 Such delegation, however, insufficiently addresses the difficul-
ties of communicating with a handicapped child.
The attorney's consultation with the child, and with others who
have authority over, information regarding, or an interest in the child,
is essential to almost every stage of representation. Consultation goals
include: (1) expanding the lawyer's knowledge of and insight into the
child's current needs and long-term interest, (2) identifying and
presenting to the client and family potential legal and extralegal re-
sponses to their problems, (3) facilitating or coordinating a course of
action sought by the client, (4) identifying potential conflicts between
lawyer and client, and between multiple clients whom the lawyer repre-
sents, and (5) obtaining information necessary to serve as advocate and
counselor in negotiations among disputing parties. Thus, consultation
can be seen as necessary to the very existence of representation.
114. See note 136 infra.
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Investigating the Client's Needs and Options
Neither the child, the parents, the lawyer, nor any other profes-
sional alone can provide an accurate account of the legal needs and
practical alternatives of a disabled youngster.1 15 Therefore, appropri-
ate consultation, although difficult, is essential.
The child and his or her family may have great difficulty in articu-
lating their objectives and the kind of legal action that they hope will
serve these ends. Difficulties with communication may cause the attor-
ney to pigeonhole the client's needs, and to presume that they have
discrete, fixed goals that can be served by legal action. Several funda-
mentally unsound considerations lead attorneys to insulate their clients
and themselves from dialogue; lawyers should adopt an interviewing
perspective expressly to counter these defensive tendencies.
The professional socialization and personality of many lawyers,
particularly when representing a handicapped client, leads them to
adopt an "ideology of advocacy" based on positivist legal theory."
6
This perspective regards the particular goals of the client as inaccessi-
ble and therefore imputes to the client certain "basic," universal inter-
ests, 117 such as maximization of wealth and freedom of movement.
These assumptions are particularly compelling when clients seem inac-
cessible, 18 for such clients are easily treated as vessels for the desires of
others. Consultation can be hindered when the lawyer begins by im-
puting certain "normal" goals to disabled children. Disabled persons
and their families often pursue different goals from those pursued by
the rest of society. Whether these differences are to be encouraged, or
whether instead "normalization" is to be preferred, is a controversial
issue among parents, professionals, and policymakers." 9 The attorney
115. See notes 11-42 & accompanying text supra.
116. See Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 39 (1978).
117. Id. at 53-54.
118. Id. at 60-61.
119. See Roos, The Law and Mental y Retarded People, 31 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1979);
Rose-Ackerman, Norms and Normalization: From Consensus to Conflict in Public Policy
Toward the Mentally Retarded (1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Hastings
Law Journal).
Until recently, there has been little disagreement on the normative values served by the
policies and programs that advocates have sought for handicapped children. That is, it was
widely accepted that "normalization" of the handicapped-through mainstreaming, deinsti-
tutionalization, and other measures designed to combat segregation on the basis of disabil-
ity-would enhance both the happiness of and the respect accorded to handicapped persons.
See Roos, supra, at 613-17; Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 1-2. This notion has recently been
challenged both by expert witnesses in litigation, see Rosenberg & Friedman, Developmental
Disability Law: A Look into the Future, 31 STAN. L. REV. 817, 820-21 (1979), and by norma-
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must attempt to avoid distortion of the facts or of the client's values by
projecting his or her views onto the client, who may too readily adopt
the attorney's preferences and assumptions.
A lawyer may justify a lack of consultation by believing that he or
she is protecting a handicapped client from stressful inquiry, but may
merely be projecting personal discomfort with learning "too much"
about the client. The fear of identifying too closely with the client, with
its risks of mutual dependency and distorted judgment, may lead law-
yers to the opposite extreme of denying commonality and limiting con-
versation. In representing these clients, the attorney also may become
cynical or despairing of the possibility of care. Thus, he or she may
impute to the client an autonomy that is neither realistic nor respectful
of personal needs and goals.
Interviewing handicapped children and their families requires a
patient, less directed approach that is more similar to psychiatric inter-
viewing than to conventional legal consultation. The Carnegie Council
for Children, in recommending a "psychotherapeutic perspective" to
those providing medical care to handicapped children, made several
observations that are equally relevant to legal services.120 Appropriate
medical or legal intervention in the lives of these children seeks to de-
velop a continuing plan to respond to chronic disorders, whether bio-
logical, psychosocial, or legal, rather than to create a discrete remedy to
an episodic problem. 121 In each case, professionals must not only iden-
tive theorists. In a recent article, Susan Rose-Ackerman distinguished three types of norma-
tive theories underlying legal reforms for the mentally retarded: (1) theories based on
maximizing or equalizing "happiness"---i.e., utility, pleasure-for mentally retarded persons
relative to other members of society; (2) theories seeking to enhance the autonomous choice-
making capacity of retarded persons; and (3) theories seeking to enhance the "respect"-
dignitary rights and status--of retarded persons by treating them as equal to nonretarded
persons. Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 6-11. Proponents of normalization have invoked each of
these theories by arguing that integrating the disabled into the classrooms and neighbor-
hoods of the nondisabled will enhance the happiness, autonomy, and respect of handi-
capped persons. Yet Rcse-Ackerman responds that this empirical claim is supported only
by questionable evidence. Id. at 12-16. Mainstreaming possibly could enhance autonomy
while detracting from the child's happiness. Autonomy often is accompanied by profound
ambivalence and conflict. See notes 37, 40-41 & accompanying text supra.
Similarly, the provision of special services for, and diagnostic labeling of, the handi-
capped may enhance their autonomy or happiness. These practices, however, necessarily
conflict with the goal of equal treatment.
There is, and may always be, insufficient evidence to identify these normative com-
promises in the aggregate. In individual cases, lawyers should require themselves, their cli-
ents, and other advocates to recognize the possibility that such compromises might exist, and
to establish normative priorities if they become apparent.
120. GLIEDMAN & RoTH, supra note 29, at 241-46.
121. Id. at 243-44.
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tify and broaden available resources, but also must help the child and
family to take advantage of these options.122 This plan requires more
consultation by the professional, and more active participation of the
client and family.
For example, when a child's orthopedic impairment is alleviated
by a prosthetic device, or when he or she is admitted to a public school
from which he or she has long been excluded, the remedy can be
eroded quickly by uncooperative service-providers, hostile peers, and
the child's sense of insecurity and discomfort with new-found free-
dom. 123 If the remedy is to benefit the client, the attorney and client
must carefully plan and continuously reflect on what liberty, treatment,
appropriate education, and other such legal rights may mean in the
client's daily life.
The legal interview, however, is necessarily less intensive and
more structured, succinct, and directed towards external events than a
psychiatric interview, 124 but some of the insights and techniques of psy-
chiatric interviewing are critical to the representation of this client
group.125 This psychotherapeutic perspective is necessary because both
lawyer and client are reduced to a more profound sense of incompe-
tence when they fail to share basic information and expectations.
26
In some cases, consultation may be sufficient to solve the legal
problem that is presented by the client or by his or her representative.
The legal problem may derive from barriers to communication within
and among bureaucracies and individuals. For instance, parents and
school officials may have agreed on a placement and individual educa-
tion plan for a child with a learning disability, but may be unable to
implement the plan. A few telephone calls and letters from the lawyer
to school administrators, simply seeking the child's records and inquir-
ing into the status of placement efforts, may suffice to overcome inertia
or coordination difficulties.
In performing investigatory and problem-solving functions, the
lawyer is likely to be perceived as a symbol of authority and potential
controversy.127 While this may make the parties with whom the lawyer
122. Id. at 244.
123. See note 119 supra.
124. See WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS 11
(1976), reprintedin THE LAWYERING PROCESS 224 (G. Bellow & B. Moultin eds. 1978).
125. See generally GILL, NEWMAN & REDLICH, THE INITIAL INTERVIEW IN PSYCHIAT-
RIC PRACTICE 65-74 (1954), reprinted in THE LAWYERING PROCESS 158-62 (G. Bellow & B.
Moultin eds. 1978).
126. See text following note 114 supra.
127. Indeed, the lawyer may be regarded as "a person who on behalf of some people
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consults more conservative and cautious, it may also provide them with
an incentive to become more reflective, accurate, and consistent in their
assessments of and decisions regarding the child.
Identifying Consultants and Weighing Their Advice
To emphasize the value of communicating with the client and the
family is not to detract from the need to consult extrafamilial sources of
information, authority, or expertise. Nonparental caretakers and serv-
ice-providers may have more familiarity with the needs and prefer-
ences of an institutionalized child. When the child lives at home,
certain service-providers have the training and insight to recognize that
the child has potential abilities, opportunities, or problems that parents
may not see.
Consultation with professionals, however, can create additional
problems. The attorney must be aware of professional and bureau-
cratic biases held by all service-providers, including lawyers. 128 Con-
sultation with an independent private professional, such as a
psychiatric social worker, may be the preferred means of minimizing
bureaucratic biases, although professional biases will remain.
Organizations of disabled persons or their parents also represent a
valuable and accessible source of information and advice. These advo-
cacy organizations often have an intimate knowledge of the bureaucra-
cies that serve the disabled, yet they retain some independence from
these agencies. Although a group may have well-defined policy posi-
tions or agency allegiances, it can provide a deliberative process for the
consideration of issues by more than one person.
Moreover, the members of these advocacy organizations can offer
the direct experience of living with a disability, or with a disabled rela-
tive. This perspective can be particularly valuable if the attorney is
unable to communicate with the disabled client or with family mem-
bers. Parent advocacy organizations, such as NARC and the United
Cerebral Palsy Society, have chapters throughout the nation, and have
been effective in initiating and advising litigation.129 Finally, state
agencies for the protection and advocacy of the developmentally dis-
abled, established under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
treats other people the way bureaucrats treat all people--as nonpeople." Dauer & Leff,
Correspondence-The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE LJ. 573, 581 (1977).
128. See note 23 supra. See also Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice
andProfessional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 39 (1978).
129. See notes 57-66 & accompanying text supra. Organizations of disabled persons,
such as the Center for Independent Living in Berkeley, are less prevalent, but provide an
often overlooked source of expertise and inspiration.
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Bill of Rights Act of 1975,130 and similar systems for the mentally ill
created under the Mental Health Systems Act of 1980,131 can provide,
or refer attorneys to, advocacy organizations and independent
consultants.
When extrafamilial consultants disagree with parent and child on
the merits of a proposed legal action, 132 the attorney should carefully
present the alternative perspective to all participants before concluding
that an irreconcilable conflict exists. Ultimately, the lawyer must sup-
port the informed choice of the client, if he or she is capable of expres-
sing such a choice. If the client cannot communicate, the attorney
should give considerable weight to the informed choice of her parent or
guardian. The child and family must make an informed decision,
based not only on their own considered values and experience, but also
on the information and advice given by the attorney and the attorney's
other consultants.
Judicial Enforcement
Whether or not these participants' views can be reconciled after
full consultation and deliberation, the lawyer should exercise in-
dependent judgment, and also, to the extent that client confidentiality
permits, report the confficting views and his or her recommendation to
the court. This procedure should be followed even if the attorney's
conclusion differs from the expressed desires of the child, parents, or
credentialed expert. 133 When assessing a variety of advice, the attorney
and the judge should not be bound rigidly to select the prevailing opin-
ion or the view of any one interested party. Instead, the views of each
must be considered to determine what is in the client's best interest.
The alternative-a fixed rule relying on the perspective of one par-
ticipant and dismissing other views-would provide ease of applica-
tion, but would not always provide the best result. An informed and
reasoned decision must rely on the synthesis of the legal analysis of the
lawyer, the self-understanding of the child, the intuitive and practical
130. 42 U.S.C. § 6012 (1980).
131. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9502 (West Supp. 1980).
132. Conflict among consultants on the needs and interests of the child must be distin-
guished from conflict among multiple clients (e.g., between child and parent when both are
considered clients), or between client(s) and lawyer, on an appropriate course of action.
While related, each type of conflict calls for distinct ethical considerations. The latter type
of conflict, between clients or lawyer and client, is discussed at notes 152-72 infra.
133. Communication problems of handicapped children and psychological barriers of
adults to communicating with such children require that decisions relating to these clients
not be vested solely in any party-whether child, guardian, lawyer, or other professional.
See notes 11-42 & accompanying text supra.
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knowledge of the parents, and the clinical and administrative insights
of outside consultants.
Two additional points about the duty of consultation should be
made. First, the appointment of a guardian ad litem to ensure consul-
tation and to resolve conflicts 34 is inappropriate to the representation
of handicapped children. Second, judicial review of these lawyer-client
consultations is both reasonable and precedented, 135 even when there
seems to be no conflict between attorney and client, or between clients.
Currently, the preferred mechanism to facilitate objective commu-
nication with disabled and minor clients is the appointment of a guar-
dian ad litem. 136 The guardian ad litem, or "next friend," is a
temporary guardian whose rights and duties are limited to matters re-
lating to a lawsuit.137 The guardian adlitem is generally a lawyer who
has not represented parties to the suit and generally has had no prior
connection with the child. An appointment of a guardian ad litem
should not serve as a substitute for, or a delegation of, the lawyer's duty
to consult. At best, the guardian ad litem can supplement the lawyer's
direct consultations.
The practical role of the guardian ad litem is limited. Occasion-
ally, the attorney for the child or parents, or one of the parents them-
selves, is appointed guardian ad litem.138 Such appointments often are
empty formalities that effectively impose no new obligations on the ap-
134. See notes 145-51 & accompanying text infra.
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 11 (6th Cir. 1974); Roberts
v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958) (although optional, appointment
usually advisable "as a matter of proper procedure"); Fraser, supra note 17, at 42-43; Mick-
enberg, The Silent Clients.- Legal and Ethical Considerations in Representing Severel, and
Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625, 630 (1979).
But see Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1973); T.H.
v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873, 876-77 (D. Utah 1975); Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 850
n.5 (D. Mass. 1975) (adequate representation without appointment); United States v. Noble,
269 F. Supp. 814, 815-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (parents assumed adequately to represent their
children, so that appointment of independent guardian is unnecessary).
137. The criteria for appointment of such guardians, and the definition of their role,
vary according to state statutes and the practices of local jurisdictions. Compare Schipper v.
Schipper, 96 Wis. 303, 313, 174 N.W.2d 474, 482 (1970) (Hansen, J., concurring) (under
Wisconsin civil commitment statute, guardian ad item must serve as advocate rather than
neutral factflnder) with COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-10-113, 27-10.5-103, 27-10.5-104 (Supp.
1980) (guardian ad litem as neutral investigator).
138. When there is a conflict of interest between parent and child, however, courts have
rejected the proposed appointment of parents or their lawyers. See, e.g., M.S. v. Wermers,
557 F.2d 170, 175-76 (8th Cir. 1977) (minor seeking abortion without parents' consent);
United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98, 104-05 (N.D. Ill. 1952)
(rejecting appointment of relatives who were codefendants of minors in antitrust action);
Marlin v. Texas Co., 26 F. Supp. 611, 614 (N.D. Tex. 1939) (attorney for life tenant, mother
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pointee. 139 Even when a person previously unaffiliated with the litiga-
tion is appointed, the appointee's ability to assist the attorney in his or
her consultation duties is restricted severely by the limits and ambigui-
ties of the role of guardian ad litem. 140 In some jurisdictions, the guar-
dian ad li/em principally serves as a neutral, factfinding arm of the
court, and does not engage in partisan advocacy. 141 When the child is
not independently represented by counsel, however, and the judge be-
lieves that his or her interests are not represented adequately, a guardi-
an ad litem may be appointed to perform services that differ only
nominally from those of the adversarial advocate. 142 In either case, the
guardian adlitem is expected to remain independent of the lawyer who
represents the child or parents, and should not perform the lawyer's
consultation functions. The lawyer should assume personal responsi-
bility for meeting and talking with the client and those who can provide
information concerning the client.
Rigorous enforcement of the consultation duty is essential, be-
cause of the powerful psychic, social, and economic disincentives
against the lawyer's performing this duty. Surveys of legal representa-
tion in civil commitment cases, in which the child's most fundamental
liberties are at stake, reveal that lawyers rarely provide more than a few
minutes of consultation, often on the day and at the hour of trial. 43
Under these proposed standards, in any case in which a lawyer
represents a disabled minor, or perhaps any severely disabled person,
the trial judge should require, before the trial begins, that the attorney
describe who has been consulted and the conclusions the lawyer has
drawn from these consultations. Judicial review should be ex parte,
nonadversarial, and informal. The lawyer should not disclose any
of remainderman minor, could not serve as minor's guardian ad litem in probate action
reviewing transfer of title of life estate).
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.14, comment at 47 (Discus-
sion Draft 1980). Without judicial enforcement and with appointments of parents or coun-
sel of record who have pre-existing commitments and limitations, the formal designation of
a guardian ad item effectively adds little or nothing, regardless of its theoretical functions.
If the duty of consultation were implemented and enforced, appointments of guardians ad
litem might not be necessary.
140. See Note, Lawyeringfor the Child, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1140-41 & nn.63-64 (1978)
(ambiguous meanings of "guardian ad i/tem").
141. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 19-10.11-113, 27-10.5-103, 27-10.5-104 (Supp. 1980);
KY. REV. STAT. § 403.090 (Supp. 1976); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 555, § 56A (Michie/Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1977); Fraser, supra note 17, at 28-29.
142. See Schipper v. Schipper, 96 Wis. 303, 313, 174 N.W.2d 474, 482 (1970) (Hansen,
J., concurring).
143. See Andalman & Chambers, supra note 3, at 56-70; Cohen, The Function of the
Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentaly Ii, 44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 427-30 (1966).
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communication protected by attorney-client privilege or strategic con-
siderations. Normally, witnesses need not be called unless the judge
deems it necessary. If the judge finds that the attorney failed to comply
in good faith with the consultation standard as codified, the judge
could order the attorney to conduct further consultation or to face dis-
ciplinary action.
Such a review requires a significant, although not unprecedented,
change in the role of judges who hear these cases. While the time, ex-
pense, and disruptiveness involved in such a review need not be great,
judges traditionally have been reluctant to inquire into the competence
of counsel or to discipline attorneys for ineffective assistance to their
clients. 44 More recently, however, some trial judges have exercised
considerable authority over preparation of counsel at both pretrial and
trial phases, through such mechanisms as pretrial conferences, advising
the client of his or her right to change counsel, and appointing advisory
counsel. 145 Appellate courts also have begun to question the effective-
ness of counsel and to formulate appropriate standards of appellate
review. 146
Although judicial enforcement of consultation and other attorney
obligations in this context may be infrequent, there is well-established
authority for more vigorous judicial review. Fifty years ago, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the need for judges to assume a more
active posture in monitoring the performance of counsel in these cases.
144. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 117-18 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (judges
"indulge the comfortable fiction that all lawyers are skilled or even competent craftsmen in
representing the fundamental rights of their clients"); Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent
Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARv. L. Rnv. 633, 637 (1980); cf. Andalman & Cham-
bers, supra note 3, at 74 (judicial passivity in civil commitment hearings); Cohen, The Func-
lion of the 4ttorney and the Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44 TEx. L. REv. 424, 449 (1966)
(same).
145. See Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93
HARV. L. REv. 633, 649-69 (1980).
146. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771 (1970) (legal advice must be "within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases"); United States v.
Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); Note, Ideniffying and
Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel- 4 New Look After U.S. v. Decoster, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 752 (1980); Address by Justice Byron R. White, before the A.B.A. Criminal Justice
Section, San Francisco (Aug. 10, 1982) (unpublished manuscript at 5-6) (on file with the
Hastings Law Journal); cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (constitutional right to
habeas review when retained counsel had possible conflict-of-interest in representing multi-
ple defendants). But see Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's
Role, 93 HARV. L. REv. 633, 642-45 (1980). This increased solicitude for the clients of inef-
fective counsel may be based, first, on a greater sensitivity to the rights violated by such
representation, and second, on the recognition that alternative remedies, such as writ of
habeas corpus or damages for malpractice, are ineffective. Id. at 645-49.
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In Powell v. Alabama (The Scottsboro Case) 147 the Court held that due
process had been violated by the trial court's appointment of a group of
local attorneys to represent collectively several inarticulate, ostracized,
young black defendants in a highly publicized rape trial. The Supreme
Court admonished the judge and the attorneys for their abdication of
personal responsibility in that case.
148
Judges should provide disabled children with greater protection
from incompetent or misguided counsel than typically is accorded a
criminal defendant. Handicapped children may not be able to formu-
late or to communicate their dissatisfaction to their attorneys or to the
courts, whereas adult defendants are able to voice their objections.
Disabled children can be subjected to losses of liberty and threats to
bodily integrity that are at least as severe as those to which criminal
defendants are subjected.'
49
Since Powell, state law and Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have permitted or required courts actively to supervise
the representation of minor and mentally disabled clients. For in-
stance, when a judge appoints a guardian ad litem, the appointee is
considered an officer of the court, and the client a ward of the court.'- 0
The judge is required to review decisions made by the attorney and the
guardian adlitem, which unquestionably would bind a competent adult
client.151
Judicial review of the duty of consultation thus is grounded both
in established precedent and in sound reason. Fulfillment of this obli-
gation could assure the judge of more complete and accurate informa-
tion on which to base a decision, and protect the client from ill-
conceived, cursory, unilateral action on the part of the attorney.
147. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
148. Id. at 56-58.
149. Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974); Fraser, supra note 17, at 28; Mick-
enberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerations in Representing Severely and
Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625, 629 (1979).
150. See Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978) (court may review settle-
ment of minor's tort claim, negotiated by attorneys for guardian ad litem and insurer, al-
though such settlement would have been binding upon a competent adult client).
151. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982) (physical abuse and restraint
of institutionalized mentally retarded person); Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (un-
consented administration of antipsychotic medication to institutionalized mentally ill per-
son); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (authorizing sterilization of mentally retarded
person on ground that "three generations of imbeciles are enough") (Holmes, J.); cf. Conser-
vatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1979) (civil commitments
involve deprivations of liberty similar to those suffered as a result of criminal incarceration;
those facing civil commitment entitled to same due process rights as criminal defendant).
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The Duty to Identify and Mediate Conflicts
Obstacles to the Identiflcation of Conflicts
The most common conflicts in representing handicapped youths
lie in the conflicting interpretations of liberty interests among parent,
child, and lawyer. Explicit protection under the United States Consti-
tution only recently has been accorded many of the liberty interests in
conflict, such as family autonomy, the child's bodily integrity, and free-
dom from institutional harm.15
2
In the recent landmark opinion of Youngberg v. Romeo, 53 the
Supreme Court decided that the constitutionally protected liberty inter-
ests of institutionalized mentally retarded persons require the state to
provide minimally adequate training to ensure safety and freedom
from undue restraint. However, the Court refrained, as it had refrained
on three prior occasions, 54 from deciding whether mentally disabled
persons have a constitutional right to training or treatment per se, even
when no amount of training or treatment could lead to unrestricted
freedom.' 5
5
In Mills v. Rogers,156 decided on the same day as Romeo, the
Court assumed that the parties were correct in agreeing that the Consti-
tution protects the liberty interest of a confined mental patient in avoid-
ing the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. It is not clear
152. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458, 2460 (1982) (recognizing
institutionalized retarded person's constitutionally protected liberty interests in reasonably
safe conditions, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint and such minimally adequate
training as reasonably may be required by these interests); Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442,
2448 (1982) (assuming involuntarily committed mentally ill patient has liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604
(1979) (parent's right to "substantial role" in decision to institutionalize their child); Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-47 (1977) (liberty interests of foster and
natural parents); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (overruling state stat-
ute requiring parental approval of minor's abortion); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
576 (1975) (establishing freedom from confinement in mental institution "without more");
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y.
1973) (right to freedom from harm in institution for mentally retarded); Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aftdsub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974) (constitutional right to treatment for institutionalized mentally ill and retarded).
153. 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2460 (1982).
154. Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31 (1981) (remanding constitutional issues for
reconsideration in light of reversal of principal statutory holding); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (establishing freedom from confinement "without more," but fail-
ing to specify what "more" is constitutionally required); Sanchez v. New Mexico, 396 U.S.
276 (1970) (dismissal for want of a substantial federal question).
155. 102 S. Ct. at 2459.
156. 102 S. Ct. 2442, 2448 (1982).
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whether the Court adopted the parties' stipulation on this matter, or
simply assumed it to be true without deciding the question.
Neither current legal ethics nor the practical. norms of the profes-
sion provide meaningful standards for identifying these recently recog-
nized and ambiguously defined liberty interests, and responding to
these types of conflicts between a minor client and his or her parents,
and between either of these parties and the attorney. The Code's Ethi-
cal Considerations on lawyer-client conflicts relate only to property in-
terests or formal role conflicts, 57 and the Considerations relating to
conflict among multiple clients similarly are unhelpful. 158 The Draft
Rules also fail to address this issue adequately. 159
From a psychological as well as a legal perspective, the potential
conflicts in this type of lawyering may not be readily apparent. The
liberty and personal interests of child, parent, and lawyer are often in
flux, ambivalent, or unclear to the parties. Disabled children, their par-
ents, and attorneys are subject to internal conflict and ambivalence in
identifying their own interests and the expectations of others, which
necessarily will lead to some disharmony of interests and expectations
among these characters. This conflict frequently is muted or sup-
pressed by these parties, however, particularly if they share the same
general objectives in legal action. For instance, a lawyer, a parent, and
a child could seek to enjoin the child's "homebound" instruction as
inappropriate and unduly restrictive; yet they could have unacknowl-
edged conflicts and uncertainty about the appropriate school placement
for the child. Alternatively, the attorney and the parents of a severely
disabled, terminally ill child could agree to seek withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical care without exploring their own uncertainties
about the facts and ethics of this choice.
160
In each of these cases, there are powerful incentives for lawyers to
avoid the potential embarrassment and discomfort that arise from iden-
157. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-2 to -13 (1979). The terms
of Ethical Consideration 5-1 and Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A) are sufficiently broad to en-
compass nonproperty conflicts, yet so vague as to provide no meaningful standards in this
context.
158. See notes 164, 166, 169-70 & accompanying text infra.
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.8 (Discussion Draft
1980).
160. See BURT, supra note 37, at 144-73. Even in nonlitigation situations, such as estate
planning, unarticulated conflicts may exist. See generally Effiand, Trust and Estate Planning,
in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 115-32 (1976); Frolik, Estate Planning
for Parents of Mentaly Disabled Children, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 305 (1979); Kay, Legal Plan-
ning for the Mentally Retarded: The California Experience, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 438, 494-96
(1972); Note, Legal Planningfor the Mentaly Retarded, 10 IDAHO L. REV. 245 (1974).
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tifying conflict. The attorney's overprotective and defensive impulses
that were identified as impediments to consultation exist with greater
force when the attorney perceives potential conflicts among family cli-
ents, or between them and the attorney. An illusory consensus based
on a denial or suppression of conflict can undermine the quality of rep-
resentation and the effectiveness of the legal action sought by the attor-
ney and the client.
A Preference/or Informed Consent
The current Code acknowledges the threat to the attorney's auton-
omy and loyalty posed by third-party employers, particularly when the
employer is an organization with a particular social or political
agenda.161 No reference is made, however, to the different kind of po-
tential conflict and the distinct ethical considerations that arise when
the employer has a personal or familial relationship with the client. In
such cases, the Code's bland exhortation that the lawyer must "con-
stantly guard against erosion of his professional freedom,"' 162 and its
prohibition of certain organizational structures for the practice of
law, 63 are particularly inadequate responses to this problem. More ap-
posite, but equally untenable, are the Code's provisions relating to the
representation of multiple clients'" and clients with mental or physical
disabilities. 65
When a conflict arises between a lawyer and client, or among mul-
tiple clients, the Code and the Draft Model Rules give attorneys two
options: decline representation or obtain the parties' consent to contin-
ued representation after full disclosure of the conflict.166 In represent-
ing handicapped children, informed consent should be the preferred
response. In situations in which interests are fixed in adverse positions,
the attorney's withdrawal from representation of one or multiple-clients
is appropriate. Interests in this context, however, are seldom so settled;
nor are they readily apparent to the lawyer or the client in the initial
encounter. The premature appointment of separate counsel, or with-
J61. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-23 (1979).
162. Id.
163. Id. EC 5-24.
164. Id. EC 5-14 to -20; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) &
comment (Discussion Draft 1980) (withdrawal of representation required if conflict exists).
165. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-12 (1979). See note 170 &
accompanying text infra.
166. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A), 5-105(C)
(1979), and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (Proposed Final Draft
1980).
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drawal from representation, may polarize, alienate, or confuse family
clients.
The treatment of informed consent in both the present and pro-
posed rules of professional conduct is deficient in two respects: (1) no
preference is given to this remedy as against the more drastic, yet less
complicated, remedy of declining or withdrawing from representation;
and (2) little guidance is provided for identifying those conflicts requir-
ing disclosure and informed consent in representing handicapped
youngsters. Unless attorneys are provided with guidance and incen-
tives for identifying conflict, disclosing it to the client, and seeking con-
sent to continued representation, they are likely to adopt the simpler
option of refusing to represent the client or of seeking separate counsel
for parent or child.
Mediation of Conflicts
The Draft Model Rules of Professional Conduct define a process
of attorney mediation between clients. 167 The guidelines provided in
the Draft Rules generally are appropriate in representing handicapped
children. At least one of the guidelines provided in the Draft Rules 168
may imply too strong a presumption against mediation in cases in
which the client is incapable of making informed decisions, or in which
risks of prejudice are minimal but palpable. The client's "incapacity"
or "vulnerability" should increase, rather than obviate, the need to en-
167. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (Proposed Final Draft 1981):
"(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
"(1) The lawyer discloses to each client the implications of the common representa-
tion, including the advantages and risks involved, and obtains each client's consent to the
common representation;
"(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compati-
ble with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed
decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interest of any
of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
"(3) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be under-
taken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any
of the clients.
"(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall explain fully to each client the deci-
sions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can
make adequately informed decisions.
"(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, if the condi-
tions stated in paragraph (a) cannot be met or if in the light of subsequent events the lawyer
reasonably should know that a mutually advantageous resolution cannot be achieved. Upon
withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients unless doing so is
clearly compatible with the lawyer's responsibilities to the other client or clients."
168. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(a)(2) (Proposed Final
Draft 1981).
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gage conflicting clients in dialogue. This can be generated by media-
tion or by the lawyer's attempt to apprise clients of potential conflicts
and obtain their consent to multiple representation. The alternative of
appointing separate counsel will not necessarily reduce the client's in-
capacity or vulnerability. A child may be more intimidated or incapac-
itated by the isolation from caretakers that can result from the
appointment of separate counsel.
Limits of Deference to Guardians
The uncritical deference to guardians and other legal representa-
tives that is espoused in both current and proposed rules of legal ethics
should be rejected. Both the Model Rules 169 and the Code 170 indicate
that the lawyer should defer to the guardian or other legal representa-
tive of a minor or mentally disabled client for decisions on behalf of
that client. Wile both codes also acknowledge the need to consult the
client, even if the client is legally incompetent, there is no suggestion
regarding how the client's expressed desires are to be represented if
they conflict with those of the guardian. These rules seem to suggest
that, while the lawyer should speak with the child to make him or her
feel represented, the guardian's decisions are final.
Parents or guardians should be entitled to a presumption that they
can speak for their child's interests. But this should be only the starting
point. While further inquiry into potential conflict between the parties
should be conducted with caution and respect, such an inquiry none-
theless should be made.
When an institution or organization serves as the child's guardian,
similar considerations should govern the attorney's identification of
and response to conflict. An institutional guardian may not be entitled
to the same degree of deference accorded to parents, who generally
have continuing awareness of and concern for their child. The same
concern for minimizing the intrusiveness and polarization of the attor-
ney's investigation of conflict remains. As the organizational guardian
has the legal authority to control most, if not all, of a minor's decisions,
the antagonism of these guardians, unmediated by bonds of kinship,
can pose a grave threat to the child whom the lawyer represents.' 7'
169. Id. Rule 1.14, comment at 47.
170. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1979).
171. See Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (institutional
guardian's expropriation of residents' funds); Morris, Conservatorshpfor the "Gravely Dis-
abled':" California'srondeclaration of Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 226-28
(1978) (institutional conservators routinely sought and were granted powers to "voluntarily"
commit conservatees and restrict their rights and privileges); Note, Legal Planning for the
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Conversely, certain caretakers employed by an institutional guardian
may provide the child with continuous nurturing. In either case, the
institutional guardian has significance and wields power in the child's
life.
Judicial Supervision
The rejection of the legal guardian as the ultimate source of au-
thority results in potentially disruptive consultation when the attorney
or child disagrees with the guardian. Counsel should form a recom-
mendation and then present this and all competing views to the court.
After conducting a limited review to ensure that the attorney has iden-
tified and sought to mediate the conflict, the judge should be empow-
ered, whenever necessary, to direct the lawyer to continue mediation of
the conflict, to obtain separate counsel for one or more of the parties, or
to follow some other course that ensures the interests of the child.
This method of judicial supervision of conflict resolution is more
controversial and problematic than is judicial review of the attorney's
consultation efforts. Acknowledgement of the conflict may prejudice
the client and embarrass the lawyer. Furthermore, risks are inherent in
the exercise ofjudicial power that instructs counsel to continue as inter-
mediary, especially if some or all of the clients have lost faith in or
cannot agree with the attorney. The powers granted the judge should
be exercised prudently.
The alternative to this judicial review, however, is more costly. If,
as is presently required, the lawyer is directed to follow the advice only
of the guardian, then the lawyer may not seek outside consultation or
independently criticize the guardian's views. The awareness of conflict
may be suppressed, and the consultation process may be truncated. 72
By requiring judicial supervision of these conflicts, both the attorney
and the court are alerted to the variety of interests that must be served
in this sort of case.
The Duty to Negotiate with Adverse Interests and Interested Third Parties
Rationale
To serve the client's interests in a legal dispute, the lawyer must
assume the obligation to negotiate not only with those who could be
considered actual or prospective clients, or their guardians or legal rep-
Mentally Retarded, 10 IDAHO L. REV. 245, 247 n.15 (1974) (broad powers of guardians for
adult incompetents under the Uniform Probate Code, adopted in IDAHO CODE § 15-5-
312(a)(1)).
172. See BURT, supra note 37, at 144-73.
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resentatives, but should also have the duty to negotiate with adverse
and third parties. This duty to negotiate must occur after, and require
more than, the duty to consult. Through consultation, the lawyer seeks
to integrate information for an assessment of the client's interests.
Through negotiation, the lawyer should seek to reconcile his or her
conception of the child's interests with the interests of opposing or neu-
tral parties to determine collectively a course of action.
173
The importance of negotiation in dealing with the legal problems
of handicapped children is great; it may establish or renew channels of
communication that normally might be closed or distorted in the face
of litigation. Having considered one another's interests and willingness
to compromise, the parties should be better able to implement a settle-
ment. Finally, by involving adversaries and third parties, negotiation
reduces the risk that unilateral decisions will be made for the client.
Disruptions in the flow of information between parents and pro-
fessionals, or within or among the myriad organizations serving or rep-
resenting disabled children, may be more readily identified or
remedied if, through negotiation, the parties are relieved of their need
to justify their prior lack of communication practices and to fix blame
on their adversaries. Many professionals have been socialized to treat
parents of disabled children with paternalism or silence, and parents
have been stifled by their own sense of intimidation and dependency in
their attempts to share information with professionals. 7 4 The legal du-
ties and social norms that require these parties to exchange information
will be new and alien to many.175 Negotiations to establish new proce-
173. The advantages of negotiation or bargaining as an alternative to litigation have
been aptly summarized by Professor Schuck. "Bargaining tends to expose the true intensi-
ties of the participants' preferences, while litigation tends to exaggerate those intensities.
Bargaining stimulates the flow of information between parties (information relevant to their
preferences, even if not to the applicable legal rules), while litigation constricts inter-party
communication (and takes a narrow view of relevance). For these reasons, bargaining can
help participants to develop a better appreciation of the perspectives of their adversaries
than litigation can, an appreciation that may reduce hostility, soften positions previously
taken, and suggest solutions that had escaped notice. In addition, because bargaining is a
process controlled by the parties themselves, any solution is likely to reflect a more sensitive
'feel' for the problem that engendered it; litigation exhibits the opposite tendency. And be-
cause a bargained solution is essentially voluntary and emerges from a process that helps
build consensus, it is more likely to generate support by both parties for its implementation;
litigation-particularly the public law variety---can pose awesome problems of implementa-
tion, in part from the continuing intransigence of a losing party." Schuck, Litigation, Bar-
gaining and Regulation, AEI J. ON Gov'T & Soc'Y 26, 31 (July/Aug. 1979) [hereinafter cited
as Schuck].
174. See GLIEDMAN & ROTH, supra note 29, ch. 8. See notes 32-36 & accompanying
text supra.
175. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
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dures can serve to focus on prospective possibilities for reform, rather
than on retrospective attribution of fault.
Collaborative, nonadversarial exchanges of information may re-
duce the tendency of caretakers and advocates to respond to handi-
capped children in characteristic modes of neglect in the name of
autonomy and segregation in the guise of protection.176 The hopeless-
ness underlying both neglect and segregation could be checked by
bringing together parties who might recognize different strengths in the
child, and different options for his or her future. This would reduce the
likelihood of diagnoses and interventions based on an incomplete and
negative view of the child.
The reduction of polarization and the enhancement of the parties'
willingness to comply with a consensual agreement achieved through
negotiation are particularly valuable.177 Parties to these disputes often
must associate with and depend upon one another for years after the
conflict could be resolved judicially. In such cases, judicial victories
over a caretaker or service-provider easily can be undone or can lead to
disputes that are unresolved for years.
178
The efficacy of a negotiated settlement, however, must not be over-
stated. Lawyers and judges who place an overriding emphasis on set-
tlement and consensus can more easily disregard or compromise the
client's vital interests. 79 A consensus reached too hastily or with too
much finality may result in the most problematic, deficient kind of set-
tlement because the negotiating parties may be ignoring reservations
that will surface later, or may be engaging in an unconscious conspir-
1064 (1972) (overruling professional standard for "reasonable" disclosure of medical treat-
ment risks); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(a)(5) (requiring parental participation in a handi-
capped child's individual education plan).
176. See notes 36-41 & accompanying text supra.
177. Cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law.- The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 954 (1979) (spousal conflict and mediation through communica-
tions). See generally Litnack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: Emerg-
ing Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816, 825 (1974).
178. For example, after months or even years of litigation, a school may be ordered by a
judge or hearing officer to pay for special services or residential treatment for a child; yet,
the following September, that school is entitled under federal statute to renew the fight de
novo. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.343(d), 300.533(a)(3) (1981). Alterna-
tively, a state may be required to release a child from an unpleasant institution, but may fail
to provide residential and other services in the community. A parent may be required to
support his or her handicapped child at home, and then seek to demonstrate his or her
helplessness or incompetence by abusing or neglecting the child. See Page, The Mother's
Decision, 75 CHILD ADOPTION 45, 52 (1974).
179. See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword.- The Forms of Jus-
tice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1979) (judicial legitimacy derives not from dispute resolu-
tion or expertise, but from the concretization of public values through rational dialogue).
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acy of silence about needs or problems of the child.180
Finally, negotiations also can reduce the risk that one person-
whether a lawyer, judge, parent, bureaucrat, or the child-would serve
as the sole arbiter of the child's fate. In these kinds of cases, the parties
often seek the convenient procedural solution of identifying a single,
authoritative, exclusive decisionmaker. Either parental or professional
authority is said to require absolute immunity, or "due process" is said
to require procedures that place decisive power in the hands of lawyers
and judges. 181
Particoation of Third Parties
The bargaining process must not be limited to formal adversary
parties in litigation. Third parties who have a substantial interest or
potential effect on the legal action sought by counsel also should be
included. Whenever possible, these parties should be identified and in-
vited to participate before negotiations begin. Often, however, it be-
comes clear during negotiations that other parties not at the table may
have greater control over the issues in dispute. These missing parties
could be included in future sessions, or could at least provide partici-
pants with a better understanding of constraints imposed by forces be-
yond their control. For instance, public schools and residential
institutions are constrained to varying degrees by federal funding and
administrative decisions. Yet the relevant sources of funding and regu-
lation-typically, the Departments of Education and of Health and
Human Services-rarely have been consulted or invited to participate
in negotiations, even when the United States Justice Department is a
party to the lawsuit.' 82
Even the internal, decentralized decisions made by the schools, in-
180. See BURT, supra note 37, at 144-73.
181. Id. at 168-69.
182. For example, in Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Cohn, No. C-78-0157-
L(A), slip op. (W.D. Ky. 1980), the Justice Department intervened on behalf of plaintiffs
who sought to enjoin the state's construction of a large residential facility for the mentally
retarded. Yet construction of the facility had been necessitated by new regulations promul-
gated by the United States Department of Health & Human Services. Telephone interview
with Arthur Peabody, Esq., Office of Special Litigation, Civil Rights Division, United States
Department of Justice, Mar. 2, 1981. Peabody described persistent, "depressing and demor-
alizing" conflict between his unit at the Justice Department, which is responsible for litiga-
tion against state facilities for the mentally disabled, and the Department of Health &
Human Services, which provides substantial financial support for these institutions. But ef.
Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 80 F.R.D. 32, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (court invited HEW official to
negotiations to design remedy to unconstitutional state appropriation of Social Security
checks of institutional residents).
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stitutions, and other service organizations require the coordination and
consent of parties who are seldom represented, such as employee orga-
nizations for teachers, institutional staff, and support staff. The attor-
ney need not invite every party who could claim a remote interest in
the child. Only those parties who could significantly inform, control, or
affect the implementation of decisions, or provide expertise or authority
to mediate disputes, need be included.
By increasing the number of parties to negotiations, a negotiated
settlement becomes more difficult to reach. 83 This difficulty is worth
overcoming for two reasons. First, the cost of excluding necessary par-
ties ultimately may be far greater because any settlement reached with-
out them may be based on incomplete information, or subsequently
undermined by their confusion or obstruction. Second, settlement is
not the only goal of negotiation. Negotiations also must be assessed in
light of the information value of the process, and by the soundness and
efficacy of the outcome.
Inherent Risks of and Grounds for Terminating Negotiations
An attorney may be reluctant to initiate or sustain negotiations
when he or she has reason to believe that the opponent will be intransi-
gent or has no incentive to make concessions. The adversary's bad
faith or superior bargaining power may be grounds for terminating
negotiations.
84
These conditions, however, should not be presumed to exist ini-
tially so as to justify avoiding attempts to negotiate. The attorney
should make a good faith attempt to initiate negotiations in all cases
because an adversary's incentives and expectations are never certain.
Opponents of superior status, wealth, or political power nonetheless
may recognize that they need the cooperation of the client and his or
her attorney. The existence of competent counsel may serve to narrow
the gaps of articulateness and status between the parties. In addition,
more powerful parties may be more inclined to make concessions
through informal negotiations that do not threaten their autonomy or
create binding precedents, than through litigation. 18 5
The possibility of unilateral bad faith or coercion is not a valid
183. Schuck, supra note 173, at 31; cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 990 (1979) (spousal agreement).
184. Schuck, supra note 173, at 31.
185. But see Getman, LaborArbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916 (1979)
(merits of arbitration in labor negotiations not transferable to other contexts, such as prisons,
with more unequal power relationships and different institutional traditions).
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basis for refusing to attempt to negotiate with an adversary, because the
parties can resort to litigation if bargaining proves to be fruitless or
unfair. A more subtle and serious problem arises from multilateral bad
faith, from both adversaries and third parties engaging in bluffing, pos-
turing, and shallow compromises.186 Without the independent force of
a judge and formal, protective procedures, negotiations can lead to a
confrontation of selfish interests or to collusive settlements. Moreover,
the process and the result may not reflect the voluntary choices of all
parties, because the "real party in interest," the child, may be unwilling
or unable to participate.
The choice between informal negotiations and formal judicial pro-
cess, however, may be academic in most of these cases. Many clients
who are young and disabled now receive no effective process because
their attorneys fail to communicate with them or to press their claims
vigorously in litigation. 187 As litigation of many matters affecting a
person's life or liberty, such as civil commitment hearings, can be
processed routinely in minutes,' 8 8 and as negotiation necessarily would
involve more time and deliberation than this, the duty to negotiate may
be seen, at least, as an incentive for attorneys to engage in more thor-
ough consultation, preparation, and reflection on the interests of the
client.
Conclusion
Representation of the handicapped child combines the distinctive
problems of representing children and representing the handicapped,
and calls for distinctive ethical considerations. There is no method by
which the needs and interests of these clients can be identified with
certainty and represented without conflict. The ethical standards of the
legal profession, however, can serve to reduce the uncertainty and con-
flict inherent in this representation by requiring that the lawyer com-
municate with the child, caretakers, and outside consultants, mediate
client conflicts, and negotiate with adverse interests.
The difficulties of effective communication require the attorney to
consult with the child, the child's parents or legal guardians, and other
involved adults to gain an understanding of the client's needs. Both the
need for and the resistance to effective communication are so great that
186. Although litigation generates its own kind of posturing, which is perhaps even more
insincere and divisive, the judge and the judicial process seek to interpose an objective and
independent source of truth, objectivity, and conscience.
187. See note 143 & accompanying text supra.
188. Id.
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active judicial supervision is recommended to ensure that communica-
tion exists and to monitor its results.
A diligent effort to communicate should be guided by a search for
conflicts between child and parents, and between either of these and the
attorney. There are powerful psychological and practical incentives to
suppress the types of conflict that arise in this type of representation,
but these conflicts must be confronted and reconciled. The impulse to
withdraw from representation should be discouraged in favor of medi-
ation. Finally, resort to litigation should occur only after an exhaustive
attempt to negotiate a resolution of the conflict. Negotiation is espe-
cially important because results achieved through the confrontation of
litigation often will lack the necessary support of the losing party.
The proposals made here are not intended to be comprehensive.
Other norms established by the Code and state laws also must be rec-
onciled for there to be effective representation of handicapped chil-
dren. 189 Most importantly, these proposed norms are intended to act as
basic, minimal standards for the tasks of consultation, identification
and resolution of conflict, and negotiation. Neither these proposals nor
any others can serve as comprehensive authority to define rigidly the
lawyer's duties and obligations. Rather, these guidelines should serve
to alert the practitioner to areas of concern and to trigger a process to
address such concerns.
189. For example, the Code provisions relating to client confidentiality, and the proce-
dures for certification and representation of classes in group litigation, must be reconciled
with the proposed standards for consultation and conflict. Under the current and proposed
Codes, information that the lawyer obtains from the client can be shared with other persons
only if the client consents to such disclosure. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY DR 4-10(C)(1), EC 4-2 (1979); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(Proposed Final Draft 1981). While this precept is appropriate in this context, distinct
problems arise from the child-client's dependency on parents and other adults, and his or
her lesser communicative skills, which make it difficult or impossible to offer or withhold
informed consent. Moreover, the lawyer's compliance with the proposed consultation and
conflict standards may increase the need to share with other persons information obtained
from the client to obtain a more accurate assessment of the client, or to identify or mediate
conflict.
Consultation and conflict management become even more problematic in class actions.
Joint or several representation of children and of organizations of their parents, teachers,
and institutional staff, see notes 58-109 supra, is most likely to occur in class actions. In such
cases, the lawyer has distinct obligations to class members who are unaffiliated with the
individual or organizational clients who retain the lawyer. Conflicts may emerge both
within the retaining organization, and between that organization and other class members.
See notes 63-66 & accompanying text supra. See also Note, Conflicts in Class Actions and
Protection of Absent Class Members, 91 YALE L.J. 590 (1982).
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